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Abstract
The paper investigates the effect of remittances on the coverage of financial deficits 
arising during youth and retirement years and their influence on some household 
behaviors. To this end, household survey information is used from Ecuador, Honduras, 
Mexico and Nicaragua to perform a number of econometric tests exploring the linkage 
between remittances and a battery of health, education and work outcomes dealing with 
young and elderly household members. The main overall finding is that, with variations 
across countries and regression specifications, remittances generally appear to exert a 
positive and robust impact. In particular, with few exceptions, remittances (a) respond to 
the lack of pensions and especially to overall household financial deficits; (b) encourage 
co-residence of the elderly with younger relatives; (c) facilitate elderly’s retirement; (d) 
increase household expenditures in health and education; (e) foster public and private 
school attendance, inhibits child labor, and improve anthropometric measures.
(*) Insightful comments from Daniel Cotlear and Pablo Acosta are greatly acknowledged. Pablo Fajnzylber 
provided very valuable suggestions in discussing an earlier version presented at the Workshop on 
Demographic Change and Social Policy organized by the World Bank in its Washington DC headquarters, 
July 14-15, 2009. We are also grateful for remarks from other Workshop participants. Any remaining errors 
are obviously our own.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the role that remittances may play in 
financing the gap between expenditure and income arising at early and late stages of the 
life cycle, and in shaping living arrangements in recipient households. 
Consumption theory posits that utility-maximizing agents strive for a smooth pattern of 
consumption over their lives, while their labor income follows a different dynamics. 
Specifically, labor earnings are typically nil for children as well as for older and retired 
workers, implying that they deal with a deficit between desired consumption and actual 
income. The situation is unlikely to change if they work, as these individuals are less 
productive than other adults, or are forced to take informal and badly paid jobs. 
Conversely, working adults are expected to have a surplus of labor income over 
expenditures, which will be used to finance consumption during retirement years. 
Graphs 1 through 4 illustrate for remittances-recipient household that this popular model 
reassuringly fits household-level data in the countries we will subsequently study: 
Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua.1 The graphs also display per capita 
remittances added to labor income. Since we do not have any information on how 
remittances are allocated among household members, it is hard to pinpoint their precise 
impact on life cycle deficits. But assuming that remittances are shared proportionately 
among all family members, as done in Graphs 1-4, it can be observed that remittances 
cover, for the average household, a significant part of the financial gap of young and old 
individuals. We further discuss these life cycle deficits in Section 2.4.
                                                
1 The calculations involve a thorough analysis and decomposition of labor income and each consumption 
item by age following the National Transfer Accounts methodology. For details, see 
http://www.ntaccounts.org/.  
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Honduras: Income and Consumption over the Life Cycle
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Mexico: Income and Consumption over the Life Cycle
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Graph 4
Nicaragua: Income and Consumption over the Life Cycle
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Our driving question is whether remittances contribute to cover the financial needs of the 
young and the elderly by spurring basic educational, labor, and health goals. A potential 
side effect of remittances that we will also investigate is whether they set off changes in 
living arrangements. To this end, we will work with the latest available national, multi-
purpose household surveys conducted in Ecuador (2006), Honduras (2004), Mexico 
(2006), and Nicaragua (2005). These countries were chosen because, among other LAC 
candidates, they all are major remittances recipients and also have household-level 
consumption data, which constitutes a valuable input for our work.
Specifically, our plan is to produce evidence on the following story. Migrants are more 
likely to send remittances home if they come from households with elderly members who 
do not receive pensions. In reaction to this income support, the elderly stay at the 
migrant’s home to take care of their grandchildren. Co-residence, in turn, has 
consequences on the well-being of both old and young household members. The elderly 
become less likely to participate in the labor force, as they now work at home, and may 
also have more means to cover for their typically high health expenses. As for the 
children, in particular those old enough to work (say, those aged 11-17), the presence of 
the elderly frees them from the need to drop out from school to babysit their younger 
siblings. In addition to these effects, we will examine whether remittances relax life cycle 
financial deficits by giving rise to: (a) Easier access to private schooling and higher 
education expenses; (b) Less child labor; and (c) Better anthropometric measures among 
children. 
Despite the flourishing literature on the linkages between remittances and diverse macro 
and microeconomic outcomes, a void persists so far in producing hard evidence on their 
association with imbalances over the life cycle. One cannot overstress the social 
significance of the topic, considering that financial shortages may hamper key 
investments in children’s human capital and other measures of wellbeing of both young 
and old individuals. These issues become even more relevant in the face of the ongoing 
crisis. Estimates for 2009 show that remittances to LAC countries would drop from 
US$69 to US$64 billion, due to job losses, earnings reductions, and less emigration (see 
Orozco (2009)). Moreover, this will mean that about 1 million households throughout the 
region will stop receiving remittances this year and another 4 million households will see 
their remittances cut by 10%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the socioeconomic profile of 
households receiving and not receiving remittances. The discussion of some 
methodological issues and the econometric results will be developed in Section 2. Some 
conclusions close. 
Section 1: Data
In this section we will provide a first approximation to the relationship between 
remittances and several outcomes concerning the youth and the elderly. Data for each of 
the four countries will be presented, splitting the sample into recipient and non-recipient 
households along with the statistical significance of the difference. The resulting statistics 
will hint some clues as to whether families are likely to receive remittances to alleviate 
financial deficits in the early and late stages of life.2 These links will be examined more 
thoroughly later on by applying multivariate econometric techniques.
Table 1 depicts the connection of remittances with income and poverty patterns. First to 
notice is the fact that the percentage of households with remittances is not high, ranging 
from 5.7% in Mexico to 20.4% in Nicaragua, with intermediate values for Ecuador and 
Honduras (16.2%). But still remittances constitute an important addition to the recipient 
households’ income, representing 15.5% in Ecuador, 19% in Nicaragua, 30.6% in 
Honduras and 49.3% in Mexico.3 This incidence is exacerbated in the case of poor 
households in Ecuador (57.7% of total income), Honduras (79.9%) and Mexico (80.4%). 
While these values largely exceed those for non-poor households in these countries, the 
wedge between poor and non-poor is rather narrow in Nicaragua (23.0% versus 18.7%). 
In terms of per capita income, remittances explain a pronounced increase of between 
18.4% in Ecuador to 97.2% in Mexico. The fraction of poor families (measured by the 
US$2 poverty line) is much lower among recipient vis-à-vis non-recipient households in 
Ecuador (difference of 5.7 percentage points based on before-remittances income 
figures), Honduras (8.8) and Nicaragua (17.2).4 The exception is Mexico, where 46.5% of 
recipient households and 12.4% of non-recipient ones are poor according to pre-
remittances income. As in the other countries, remittances to Mexico drastically diminish 
                                                
2 Our observations coincide to the most part with the evidence collected for various Latin American 
countries, including those here studied, by Acosta, Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007).
3 It must be noted of course that the difference between post- and pre-remittances income is magnified by 
the fact that the latter is affected by the lost income of the member/s leaving for a foreign country. We 
calculate and use the counterfactual income later on in Section 2.
4 The difference of course widens after accounting for the extra income coming from abroad.
poverty among recipient households, which goes down to 10% from the above figure of 
46.5%. 
Given our interest in the use of remittances to finance consumption during retirement, 
(which would imply some substitution between pensions and remittances), we present 
Tables 2 and 3 to shed some preliminary light on the subject. These tables confirm that 
formal old-age income support is thin in both the extent of elderly population coverage 
and the size of pensions, reinforcing the potential income-compensating role of 
remittances. To begin, Table 2 shows that a majority of households with elderly members 
have neither pensions nor remittances: 57.6% in Ecuador, 74.5% in Honduras, 61.2% in 
Mexico and 53.0% in Nicaragua. Offering some initial backing to the offsetting role of 
remittances in retirement years, they appear to be more prevalent among families without 
pensions than otherwise. For instance, 14.6% of all Ecuadorian households with no 
pensions have remittances, but just 7.6% have both of them. The same figures for 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua are 16.1% and 3.2%, 7.2% and 1.2%, and 30.9% and 
7.5%, respectively. A similar conclusion emerges from the proportion of income 
explained by remittances in pension recipient and non-recipient families, which amount 
to 9.8% and 18.3%, respectively in Ecuador, 21.8% and 25.4% in Honduras, 27.5% and 
36.6% in Mexico, and 15.8% and 18.6% in Nicaragua.5
Table 4 compares basic features of recipient and non-recipient households. The 
household size, number of children and number of elderly are not visibly different 
between these two groups. Recipient households, though, are more likely to have an 
elderly member, which is probably related to the need to take care of children after the 
departure of either of their parents. Households are headed by women or elderly members 
much more frequently in recipients than in non-recipients, but still this fraction is not as 
high as might be expected. Specifically, the data teaches us that the head in recipient 
households is an adult male under 65 –that is, the kind of individual a priori most likely 
                                                
5 Although families without a pension have a higher income coming from remittances, in households with 
access to both sources of income, pensions still contribute a proportion similar or even higher than 
remittances.
to migrate- in 49% of the cases in Ecuador, 39.7% in Honduras, 19.4% in Mexico and 
21.2% in Nicaragua. In a related vein, in only 29.1% of the recipient households in 
Ecuador the migrant was the former head, and in just 27.6% of Honduran recipient 
families the current head is the migrant’s spouse. Recipient families are predominantly 
urban vis-à-vis non-recipient ones, again with the exception of Mexico. The years of 
education of the head in recipient households is slightly larger than in non-recipients, 
save for Mexico (5.4 years against 8.0 in non-recipients), but a noteworthy feature is that 
migrant’s education is between 2 and 4 years longer than that attained by the household 
head at home (unfortunately, migrant data is not available for Mexico). 
Table 5 summarizes the selected outcomes for children and older members in recipient 
and non-recipient households. A quick inspection of the data delivers a disheartening 
general landscape in terms of human capital investments during the childhood and of old-
age wellbeing in these countries, yet slightly mitigated in some remittances-recipient 
households. Regarding the elderly, statistically significant differences in favor of the 
latter households vis-à-vis non-recipient are observed for: (i) Percentage of individuals 
not invoking economic reasons for not visiting a doctor when ill in Ecuador; (ii) Regular 
medical checkups in Honduras; (iii) No labor participation in Nicaragua; (iv) Early 
retirement (proportion of people aged 55-70 already retired) in all four countries; and (v) 
Fraction of elderly living alone or with other elderly in Ecuador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, where less, rather than more, older people from recipient households has a 
house of their own. This last difference reveals that housing decisions depend not just 
upon budget constraints but also upon intra-household arrangements. For instance, older 
people may have the means to leave, but they may rather stay to take care of the children 
while the parents are out working. 
Children from recipient households are better off compared to those from non-recipients 
regarding the following outcomes: (i) Primary and secondary school attendance in all 
countries but Mexico; (ii) Attendance to primary and secondary private schools in all four 
countries; (iii) Weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores in Ecuador and Honduras (the 
only countries with available data); (iv) No labor participation in all countries but 
Mexico; and (v) Education to total household expenses in Honduras and Nicaragua (with 
a significant but negative difference in Mexico). It must be noted that Mexico’s condition 
as an outlier in some outcomes under consideration can be rationalized in light of 
previous tables, which gives account of Mexican recipient households as being 
predominantly poor, rural and relatively uneducated.
Section 2: Results
2.1 Methodological issues 
Before going into the estimations, it is necessary to discuss three serious methodological 
issues that are paramount to a meaningful interpretation of our findings, namely, (1) The 
transmission channel from remittances to life cycle deficits, in particular the relationship 
between individual- and household-level deficits, and (2) The potential endogeneity of 
remittances.
In regard to the transmission channel, the central issue has to do with the expected effect 
of remittances on meeting the funding needs of the youth and the elderly. First, in theory, 
it is not clear that remittances will cover life cycle deficits under all circumstances 
because (a) Each family may have different objective functions to maximize, and these 
may not prioritize some of the outcomes under analysis, and (b) Migrants, rather than 
being altruistic, may pursue self-interest, and hence send remittances for clearly specified 
personal investments without any enlargement of household’s budget, such as real state, 
deposits, and the like (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007)). Secondly, financing gaps 
affect some particular individuals, while remittances are sent to the whole household, 
which pool their different sources of income (from labor, capital, remittances and others) 
to purchase a wide set of goods and services. Money fungibility blurs the nexus between 
remittances and particular expenditures. Even if remittances are earmarked by the 
migrant to finance specific uses, such information is usually not observable by the 
researcher. By the same token, remittances may actually be allocated to specific items, 
but even so they might have a positive impact on other outcomes by liberating previous 
budget constraints –for example, money may be sent to buy a home, but now the family 
previously allocated to pay the rent will be available for paying, say, a private school 
tuition. Thus, instead of inspecting the direct correspondence between remittances and 
our outcomes of interest, one is forced to look at whether the reception of remittances 
reshape behaviors after controlling for other relevant factors. 
A proper analysis of the transmission channel also requires a clear identification of the 
outcomes that remittances are able to affect. Although households may target a broad 
array of goals for their members, we would be able to claim a positive effect of 
remittances on overcoming financial deficits only if we focus on goals that involve 
pecuniary costs. For example, a complete vaccination plan for children or attendance to 
public school may be available at no cost from government providers, so remittances are 
inconsequential in this case.6 On the other hand, failure to reach normal anthropometric 
measures or the existence of child labor directly attest to the insufficiency of regular 
household income to cover basic necessities, and money from remittances might be 
instrumental in solving this deficiency.7
In a related vein, another factor to take into account is that financial deficits are bound to 
come up in people lacking enough earnings to afford current expenses, but this does not 
imply that the household as a whole is in deficit. For example, it is clear that a high 
income household can easily fill the financing gaps of its young and old members, just by 
making use of the surpluses generated by the working members, and without any need for 
additional resources in the form of credit or remittances. Conversely, whenever pre-
remittances household income is insufficient to adequately provide for the needs of 
children and old members, it is likely that some basic expenses for health and education 
purposes may be cut, that children may start early their working career and that old 
members may continue theirs beyond a typical retirement age. The empirical relevance of 
this argument can be tested by interacting remittances with a variable reflecting the 
household financial constraint, that is, the gap between actual household income and the 
minimum needed to reach the desirable outcomes for their young and old members. As 
                                                
6 By the same token, we must assume that households have a strong preference for these costly services 
over free-of-charge public substitutes and that there exist no non-economic reasons for refraining to use 
private services (for example, parents may feel intimidated to send their children to private schools in light 
of social differences).
7 Similar skepticism surrounds health insurance variables. Remittances may play a role as long as a 
household or individual lacks any insurance at all, and then the money sent from abroad allows them to pay 
for such insurance. However, if an individual reports having a public or private insurance plan, it may be 
the case that he has a formal job with this social benefit attached, or that a retired elderly retains his former 
insurance since she was an active worker, and the cost is deducted from her pension. Again, more 
information would be needed to draw a verifiable connection between health insurance and remittances, so 
we opted for leaving this sort of variable outside of our analysis.
this gap is not observable, we will take poverty as a proxy for financial constraints.8 We 
use the 2 dollar poverty line based on household income before remittances.9
Turning now to the other major methodological caveat, a serious pitfall at the moment of 
interpreting OLS results is that estimates may be contaminated by endogeneity bias. 
Whenever endogeneity is present, one may tend to mistakenly attach to remittances a 
welfare-improving effect that they do not have. Endogeneity emerges as a consequence 
of omitting a relevant variable in the model affecting simultaneously remittances and the 
dependent variable. The underlying misspecification stems from selection bias, meaning 
that the set of remittances senders is not randomly chosen but self-selects on the basis of 
observable and non-observable characteristics that are not nested into the econometric 
model and that also have an impact on the outcome under study. When these 
characteristics are observable, the obvious solution is to include this variable on the right-
hand side. When they are not observable, one must follow an instrumental variable (IV) 
technique, aimed to identifying one or more variables that are highly correlated to the 
endogenous explanatory variable  (that is, remittances) but not directly associated to the 
dependent variable.
Economic theory is called for in guiding the search for endogeneity bias in a regression. 
The education/remittances nexus may be plagued with selection bias caused by the 
omission of household wealth and income shocks in the estimated equations. In the 
presence of high migration costs and financial constraints, individuals from wealthier 
households may be more likely to migrate (and send money to the relatives left behind). 
At the same time, these families are expected to place a higher value on education and to 
                                                
8 This might be an over-conservative choice as long as some strictly non-poor families might as well be 
unable to afford some expenses from our list of desirable outcomes, but it still is a safe choice in view of 
the lack of a more precise measure of financial constraint. 
9 We acknowledge that pre-remittances underestimates household income by ignoring the earnings of the 
migrant had he stayed home. Ideally, we would like to compare the household expenditures on children-
and old-related items when the migrant was still living and working at home with those once the migrant 
has settled abroad and started sending remittances. This marginal effect of remittances cannot be estimated 
due to lack of information on past income and consumption. Even after imputing counterfactual income to 
the migrant (as we will do later on), the same cannot reliably be done with household expenditures. In a 
sense, therefore, we are assuming that none of the outcomes under analysis were affordable before the 
migrant left, and thus we assign the full effect to remittances. Section 2.3 puts forward an alternative 
technique intended to deal with some of these shortcomings.
have healthier children, all of which heightens the probability of regularly attending 
school. In turn, a volatile domestic income may simultaneously push adult members 
towards foreign labor markets and pull children out of school to take a job or stay at 
home babysitting her siblings while adults work outside. In the end, we may observe a 
positive correlation between education and remittances being explained not by a causal 
link but by the joint influence of a third variable.10
Labor participation is most likely to be exposed to a similar econometric qualification. A 
case in point is one in which an adverse economic situation forces young and/or old 
household members to enter the labor market at the same time that leads adults into 
moving abroad in search of better job opportunities.11 In children health matters, extreme 
poverty or negative income shocks may give rise to malnutrition and deficient 
anthropometric measures, accompanied by the adults’ decision to migrate in order to 
make up for the small or lost income at home.
Despite these considerations, endogeneity needs to be tested rather than just postulated –
endogeneity is possible but not certain, and the size of such bias is unknown a priori. In 
consequence, in order to detect this potential endogeneity and then circumvent it if 
necessary, we will start by controlling for household wealth. House ownership is a nice 
proxy for pre-remittances wealth in that the odds that a household might have bought a 
house out of remittances are quite slim.12 For one, annual remittances are typically small 
relative to house prices. Secondly, and adding to the previous point, recipients consulted 
in different surveys inform that most of the money is channeled towards current 
expenses, and a marginal portion, well below 10%, goes to real state purchases.13,14
                                                
10 Ability -an unobservable variable- may play a similar role to household wealth. 
11 The decision to send some adult members to work in other countries can also be based on a strategic 
household choice to diversify local systemic risk rather than just responding ex post to a negative shock.
12 Acosta (2006) employs an index of household assets, but one cannot be sure without further information 
whether some of these assets were bought with remittances money, that is, these assets might represent an 
endogenous outcome themselves.
13 BCH (2008) informs that in Honduras recipients devote, as of 2007, 71.2% in daily expenses, 8.6% in 
school expenses, 3.4% in construction, 5.8% in productive investments, and 9.2% is saved. For Mexico, 
consumption uses explain 78% of total remittances, education 7%, home purchase 1%, investment 1%, and 
saving 7% (see CESOP (2004)). 
Our preferred instrumental variable is the migrant’s social network, measured by the 
percentage of households from a given city living abroad (see Acosta (2006)). By 
reducing the cost of migrating and improving the labor prospects of a new migrant, the 
presence of relatives or neighbors in a foreign community increases the probability of 
sending remittances, without affecting any of our dependent variables, thus meeting the 
required conditions of a good instrument.15
2.2. Econometric results
In what follows we present our empirical findings. For the sake of clarity, and given the 
numerous regressions being reported, we will only comment here on the estimates on our 
variables of interest, leaving outside the discussion about the controlling set of socio-
demographic variables included in each case, which generally yield the expected sign.16
Before starting, let us recall that the empirical story presented at the outset implies the 
verifiable hypotheses that remittances: (a) are more likely to be sent to households with 
elderly lacking pension payments; (b) make it more likely the co-residence of the elderly 
with younger relatives, in particular in households with children that need to be taken 
care of; (c) facilitate the retirement of older workers at the legal retirement age or even 
earlier than that, in response to their new role at home; (d) help the elderly afford their 
                                                                                                                                                
14 A sensible reply to this statement is that money is fungible, and one cannot take the reported remittances 
allocation as a reliable data on how money is spent. For example, it would be possible that remittances 
allow recipients to save most of their regular income for house purchase purposes, in which case 
remittances may be indirectly financing the purchase of a house. Unfortunately, surveys do not usually 
provide information on the substitution between remittances and other sources of income, but an educated 
guess dictates that survey respondents refer to the overall allocation of household income - the very 
fungibility property would make it difficult for the recipients themselves to isolate the use of each type of 
income.
15 McKenzie and Sasin (2007) contend that village network are not always such a good instrument for 
outcomes abroad, citing the case in which the village network are an artifact to get better jobs and boost 
migrant’s earnings. 
16 Different specifications and samples were tested in running the following regressions, and the reported 
results proved to be insensitive to such changes, which speaks in favor of their robustness. To save space, 
we only present our preferred equation in each case, but the full set of regressions are available upon 
request.
usually steep health expenditures; and (e) foster children school attendance by liberating 
them from the obligation of babysitting younger siblings while parents are at work. 
To start, Table 6 takes the reception of remittances as the dependent variable so as to 
examine whether they substitute for the lack of pensions. After controlling for standard 
variables expected to have some bearing on the decision to send remittances (such as the 
marital status, age and gender of the household head, the maximum education level 
within the household, the number of children under 15 years old, the area of residence, 
and per capita consumption), we test whether the access to pensions by elderly members 
affects the remittances decision. If a negative relationship comes up between pensions 
and remittances, it would mean that remittances are, among other motives, driven by the 
desire of the sender to make up for the lack of resources of elderly relatives to self-
finance expenses during retirement years. We start by controlling for the presence of at 
least one elderly in the household. In Ecuador and Mexico, this variable turns out to be 
positive and highly significant. Depending on the regression equation, the marginal
probability goes up by between 5.1 and 5.8 percentage points in Ecuador and between 1.1 
and 1.7 in Mexico, suggesting that migrants do care for the wellbeing of their older 
relative left behind. Having said this, we do not observe the same behavior in Honduras 
and Nicaragua, where the coefficient is positive but significant at only 10% in Nicaragua 
and plainly non-significant in Honduras. Though, this is not a proper test for the effect we 
want to identify, as we need to make sure that the elderly being benefited by the 
remittance actually suffer from a financing gap. A better specification should consider 
whether such elderly receive a pension. Getting a pension shrinks the likelihood of 
receiving remittances by 1.8 percentage in Ecuador and 4.4 in Mexico, reinforcing the 
idea that remittances partially substitute for pensions. Notice that our dataset for  
Honduras and Nicaragua fails again to lend support to this hypothesis, which is in line 
with the previous result. An additional refinement is still possible by interacting the 
pensions dummy with a non-poverty dummy taking value 1 if the individual is poor in 
terms of pre-remittances income and 0 otherwise. The interpretation is that, under the 
altruistic view, the migrant will be less likely to send money back home not only if the 
elderly has a pension but especially if the household income is high enough to cover for 
the deficit of the older members –as an illustration, if the elderly receives no pension but 
her family makes a good income, the relative living abroad may not feel inclined to make 
any transfer. On empirical grounds, however, the transformed pension variable yields 
estimates that do not differ much from those of the pension dummy alone. 
One may legitimately wonder why the altruistic model, under which migrants support 
old-age consumption, seems to apply to Ecuador and Mexico but not to Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Unfortunately, lack of more detailed information prevents us from inferring 
the strategic decisions of the household and the migrant. For a variety of reasons, 
migrants may not be especially concerned about the older members of the family, 
targeting instead their financial assistance towards items favoring exclusively younger 
members or the household as a whole (for example, the purchase of durable goods or the 
payment of the rent). In this spirit, the same Table 6 shows that the number of children 
under 15 years old increases the likelihood of receiving remittances in all countries but 
Nicaragua. It is also possible that the migrant pursues some personal, non-altruistic goals, 
such as building up a stock of wealth for future use upon returning home.17 The drawback 
of this argument is that, under this hypothesis, the migrant would not be looking after her 
family, and hence the remittances reception model would yield non-significant estimates 
on most household characteristics. Since Table 6 proves otherwise, the explanation for 
cross-country differences should be looked for elsewhere -provided information permits, 
which unfortunately is not the case in the context of our household surveys.
Moving on, Table 7 displays the determinants of the probability of co-residence of older 
individuals (aged 65+) and children (aged 10 or below) in the same household. The 
remittances dummy bears a positive and significant sign (with marginal probabilities 
ranging from 6% to 14%) in all countries but Nicaragua, where the estimate is 
significantly negative. However, when we interact this variable with the poverty dummy 
already used in Table 6, all four coefficients turn positive and significant, the most likely 
reason being that poor families have more incentives to exploit economies of scale by 
                                                
17 Here, the positive and significant sign on per capita consumption may suggest, beyond the migration 
costs argument outlined earlier, that migrants come from families that are able to live on their own income, 
so remittances may be channeled home for personal investments of the migrant. Acosta, Fajnzylber and 
Lopez (2007b) show that in Nicaragua remittances flow to the top percentiles of the income distribution.
avoiding the extra expenditure of the elderly paying rent or buying a house for leaving by 
themselves. 
As stated at the beginning, we expect the elderly (65+ years old) from recipient 
households to self-exclude from the labor market. This is exactly what we find in Table 8
in all countries, but only with statistical significance in Mexico and Nicaragua. 
Nevertheless, the result becomes highly significant once we interact the remittances 
reception variable with poverty, which might explained by the fact that in poor families it 
is likely that all adult members, included women, work outside, making it more 
imperative the presence of the elderly to look after the children. The same storyline 
justifies the evidence of early retirement among individuals 55-70 years old encountered 
in Table 9, where the effect is present with both the remittances dummy and, with a larger 
point estimate, with the remittances-poverty interaction.18
The impact of remittances on health expenditures is estimated in Table 10. In this case, 
we test four different remittances-based variables: besides the remittances dummy and 
the same binary variable interacted with poverty, we evaluate the effect of the logarithm 
of per capita remittances and the latter again interacted with poverty –the value of 
remittances may be of interest because the dependent variable is a monetary variable. 
Notice that the sample size is substantially smaller when the value of remittances, as 
opposed to the dummy variable, is employed -in some cases, the remittances value 
sample is less than one tenth the dummy sample. This provides an unintended but useful 
robustness check for our results. Table 10 reveals that remittances also seem to boost 
health expenditures in all countries but Honduras.19,20 Per capita remittances is significant 
in all three countries, while the other remittances variables are significant in some 
countries but not in others. Finally, the claimed positive effect on school attendance
                                                
18 We extend the early retirement effect until 70 years old because it is not unusual in our country sample 
for people to work beyond the legal retirement age.
19 Although this item comprises expenses benefiting other household members, it is natural to think that 
older individuals have a larger and more frequent demand for health services. In any case, we replied the 
exercise using the imputed health expenditures to the elderly members, resorting to the National Transfer 
Accounts (NTA) methodology, without observing any worth mentioning change in the overall results.
20 In this and other expenditure items, OLS estimations are corrected using the Wu-Hausman procedure to 
control for endogeneity of household expenditures. See Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).
among children between 11 and 17 years old is confirmed in Table 11.21 Mexico is the 
only exception. This situation might stem from the fact that Mexican migrants come from 
households with low levels of education, as shown earlier, and thus remittances might not 
modify the seemingly low value placed on human capital accumulation.
Leaving behind the nexus between remittances and co-residence and its impact on some 
household expenses and decisions, we now turn to additional outcomes likely to be 
influenced by remittances. Access to private school, according to Table 12, is once again 
enhanced in recipient households in all countries; the interaction between the remittances 
dummy and poverty is always significant, while per capita remittances is significant in all 
countries but Mexico. Based on Table 13, in all countries the reception of remittances and 
their size spur this consumption item (yet though some negative signs are found for poor 
families in Nicaragua and Honduras). Table 14 shows that child labor lowers in recipient 
households in all four countries, and this effect is uniformly significant for the 
remittances dummy (and for some, but not all, of the other three remittances variables). 
Finally, Tables 15 and 16 explain, for Ecuador and Honduras, the determinants of two 
anthropometric measures: the height-to-age and the weight-to-age z-scores. Results point 
to a positive effect for both children health indicators in Honduras and, with borderline 
statistical significance, also in Ecuador.
Having reported the main evidence, it may be helpful to visualize the overall results in 
summary Table 17. Along with the expected sign for each dependent variable, the table 
contains the cases where at least one of the remittances variables had the correct sign and 
was significant at 10% or less (labeled as Y, for Yes), the cases where none of such 
variables met these conditions (labeled as N, for No), and those with significant yet 
conflicting results (denoted by an interrogation mark). Based on this classification, we 
find that our empirical predictions mostly tend to be confirmed by the data. Out of a total 
40 cells (11 dependent variables times 4 countries, minus 4 cases without data), only 4 
                                                
21 We look at this age range because it includes the children most likely to participate in labor markets or 
being charged with the responsibility of taking care of their younger siblings. Here we only include the 
remittances dummy since the broad access to free public school breaks the link between remittances, 
income and school enrollment.
contradict the priors and another two deliver mixed results. Looking closer to these cases, 
we have (i) the lack of response of remittances to pensions in Honduras and Nicaragua, 
which might have to do either with a different household behavioral model or with the 
fact that the number of pensioners is too small in these countries and the statistical tests 
are in consequence not fully reliable; (ii) the level of health expenditures in Honduras; 
and (iii) co-residence in Nicaragua; and (iv) School attendance and education 
expenditures in Mexico, where the educational background of the recipient household 
might be at play in rationalizing the results. As argued before, further information on the 
migrant and his or her household of original may come in handy to further inquiry on this 
subject.
2.3 Dealing with potential endogeneity 
Before closing, attention must be paid to the endogeneity bias that might potentially 
distort our results by inflating the coefficients and attaching a spurious causal effect to 
remittances. The social network variable previously introduced was employed to 
instrument remittances. This variable is proxied by the number of migrants from the same 
village as the household, as a percentage of total village population.22 As can be seen 
there, most estimates become non-significant after implementing this instrumental 
variable method. However, we are not fully convinced about the instrument’s suitability
in our case. In the first place, the first-stage equations regressing the remittances variables 
on the social network variable and other exogenous variables do not have a compellingly 
high goodness-of-fit. Secondly, the IV coefficients were dramatically different in both 
size and sign from the probit and OLS estimates presented in Section 2.2, casting serious 
doubt as to the quality of this instrument. In view of this, we opt for not reporting the 
results. 
Instead, we have made use of propensity matching score to circumvent the risk of any 
endogeneity contaminating previous estimations. In a nutshell, this non-parametric 
                                                
22 In light of data limitations, we use in Mexico the number of recipient households instead of migrants. In 
Ecuador, data refers to migrants in the last five years, which somewhat limits the measurement of  social 
network.
technique searches for households with similar features in crucial observable aspects, but 
differ in terms of a certain treatment (in our case, receiving remittances or not). These 
similarities include the level of counterfactual income, that is, we impute to recipient 
households an estimation of the lost migrant’s income. By comparing household without 
observable differences, we are minimizing the omitted variable problem, thus to a great 
deal getting rid of the source of any possible endogeneity. The methodological details of 
the calculation of the counterfactual income and the estimation of propensity matching 
scores are relegated to an Annex at the end of the document.
The results appear in Table 18 (elderly-related outcomes) and 19 (child-related 
outcomes), and are by and large in line with our previous findings, providing reassuring 
support for our empirical claims.
2.4 An alternative approach
Our testing approach so far was centered on looking at how some household 
characteristics and outcomes affect and are affected by remittances. Since we are 
interested in the link between remittances and life cycle deficits, an appealing and 
complementary procedure consists of examining these variables more directly. To this 
end, we computed the ratio [Consumption - Labor Income]/Consumption for household 
members aged 14 and under, those aged 65 and above, and for the whole household. 
Expenditure and income by age was measured through the National Transfer Account 
method already employed in Section 1. This ratio is positive (with a maximum of 1 when 
labor income is zero) for individuals confronting a deficit of own labor income vis-à-vis 
consumption, and gets negative (with a maximum absolute value equal to Labor 
Income/Consumption) for surplus individuals. 
Table 20 shows the figures for the whole sample of surveyed households, ratifying that 
children present a ratio close to 1 in all countries, that working adults have a surplus, and 
that older members face a deficit. What is more interesting to our purposes is that 
recipient households consistently have higher old-age and overall household deficits (or 
lower surpluses).23 This puts on the table fresh evidence on the positive role of 
remittances on smoothing household expenditure. 
Less clear is whether remittances react more strongly to life cycle or household deficits. 
Rephrasing, we wonder whether migrants feel more compelled to sending money back 
home if they identify deficits among the more vulnerable age groups in the household 
(young and old members), or instead they worry about the deficit of the household as a 
whole. The latter case would not imply that they do not care about the fortune of children 
and elderly relatives, but that they look more broadly into the household’s financial 
troubles, in the sense we already argue in Section 2.1. To shed some light on this issue, 
we run some regressions reproduced in Table 21, where the dependent variable is the 
reception of remittances and the explanatory variables are the combined deficit of the 
members under 15 and above 64 years old and the whole household’s deficit. Additional 
key controls are also included. The main conclusion is that household deficits seem to be 
more relevant than life cycle deficits: for one, when entered separately, the estimated 
coefficient on the combined life cycle deficit is either non-significant (as in Mexico) or 
much lower, by as much as three times, than the household deficit coefficient; second, 
and foremost, when both deficits are included, only the latter remains positive and highly 
significant. 
                                                
23 Since children deficits are all in the vicinity of 1, the difference between recipient and non-recipient 
households is negligible. 
Conclusions
Exploiting recent national household surveys from Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and 
Nicaragua, our paper aimed to seek empirical evidence on the hypothesis that remittances 
serve the goal, among others, of covering financial deficits arising in the early and late 
stages of life. Under this hypothesis, households receiving remittances should be able to 
finance key expenditures in human capital and health, as well as avoiding labor 
participation for young and old household members. Standard descriptive statistics and 
multivariate regression exercises lend broad support to the assertion to remittances seem 
to exert a positive role. In particular, with few exceptions, remittances (a) respond to the 
lack of pensions and especially to overall household financial deficits; (b) encourage co-
residence of elderly with younger relatives; (c) facilitate labor retirement at legal or early 
ages; (d) increase household expenditures in health and education; (e) foster public and 
private school attendance, inhibits child labor, and improve anthropometric measures.
Although governments do not have direct control over remittances flows, these positive 
effects call for policies that do not hamper these transfers by, for example, requiring 
higher legalization or taxation on them. Remittances appear to play a key social role as 
part of an informal, private social protection net, which strengthens intra-household 
relations and ineludible human capital investments. As remittances partly substitute for 
the lack of official social protection, any measures aimed to lowering barriers to 
remittances (including the cost of international money transfers) at the points of origin 
and destination would act as an implicit form of social aid. 
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Methodological Annex for Section 2.3
We have followed the methodology advanced by Acosta, Calderon and Fajnzylber 
(2008), who use a two step selection model for estimate the counterfactual “non 
remittances income”. The reduced-form income equation for the household adopts the 
following specification:
i 2 2 2log(Y ) i i iX H      
where Yi is the per capita non-remittances income, Xi  is a vector of household 
characteristics , Hi is a set of characteristics of the household head, and i is unobserved 
heterogeneity in the income generation. As we have mentioned, the income “net of 
remittances” is a bad proxy for Yi, so we can assume that Yi is only observed for a 
subsample (the non recipient households) and use this for predicting the non remittances 
income of the rest of the sample (the recipient households). Running OLS on the former 
equation would lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters (and hence inconsistent 
predictions) because as we have shown in previous sections, there exists evidence 
suggesting that migrants are not randomly selected from the pool of households. Acosta, 
Calderon and Fajnzylber (2008) propose to use a two step model based on Heckman 
(1979) framework, including in the income equation a variable that reflects the 
“propensity to receive remittances” (or to migrate). The two equations of the model have 
the following specification:
*
1 1 1
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where Zi are a set of variables related with the decision of migration/sending remittances 
but not related with the income generation (the exclusion restriction). The variable 
    1 1 1 1 1 1/ 1i i i i i ii X H Z X H Z                   is the inverse Mill’s ratio, with 
1 1( | )i i i i i iE v X H Z         and cov( , ) / var( )i i iv   . M*i is the (unobserved) 
propensity to not receives remittances, and we only observe Yi for the subsample with  M
*
>0.
After estimating the income equation for the non-recipient household subsample, we can 
consistently predict the non-remittance income for the recipient households24. Note that 
the set of variables Xi used for prediction must be based on the pre-migration scenario, so 
we have to “correct” some variables using the migrant information. This is for example 
the case of the household size, where we have used the observed size plus the number of 
migrants.  The variables included in Zi are the migrant networks, an index of assets of the 
house and their interaction. The variables included in the Xi and Hi set are the size of the 
household, the number of members in different age and gender groups, the mean and the 
maximum years of education of the household, the age of the head and its squared.
                                                
24 We only divide the sample in recipient and non recipient households independently of the migration 
status. The assumption behind this selection rule is that migration and remittances are the same process.
Finally, we add to the income prediction of the model an error component generated from 
a distribution with the same properties (mean and variance) than the distribution of errors 
of the estimated equation.  
Once we have constructed the counterfactual income for the scenario with no migration 
and no remittances, we still have to deal with the selection problem caused by the fact 
that migrants are not randomly selected from the pool of all household in the sample. 
There are several ways to correct this bias, but we can take advantage of the binary nature 
of our interest variable (remittances reception) and apply the instrumental of the 
evaluation literature. For allowing some parallelism with the evaluation literature 
notation, we define the remittances reception as the “treatment variable”. Suppose that we 
are interested in the effect of remittances on a particular outcome Y and it can take two 
different values depending of the treatment status. We call Yi
T the outcome resulting 
when the individual i receives remittances and Yi
NT the outcome resulting if the same
individual don’t receive remittances. There is bias arising because we can’t observe the 
same individual in both scenarios. More technically, we can only observe (Yi
T|Di=1) and 
(Yi
NT|Di=0) where Di is an observed dummy indicating if the individual receives 
remittances. A simple mean difference of these two variables can be expressed as 
E[Yi
T|Di=1] - E[Yi
NT|Di=0] and correspond to the differences we can estimate from the 
descriptive tables commented before. Adding and subtracting the term E[Yi
NT|Di=1], we 
obtain: 
E[Yi
T|Di=1] - E[Yi
NT|Di=1] + E[Yi
NT|Di=1] - E[Yi
NT|Di=0] = 
E[Yi
T  -  Yi
NT   |Di=1] + E[Yi
NT|Di=1] - E[Yi
NT|Di=0]
The first term, E[Yi
T  -  Yi
NT   |Di=1] is known as the “Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated” (ATT) and correspond to the effect of the remittances on the subsample of 
recipients25. The second term E[Yi
NT|Di=1] - E[Yi
NT|Di=0] is the selection bias that is 
unobserved because of E[Yi
NT|Di=1]. Note that the bias arise from the fact that we don’t 
observe the outcome that the individuals with remittances (D=1) would have had if they 
hadn’t received remittances. The bias tells us that the treated individuals (recipients) can 
have systematic differences in the output independent of the treatment status. If the 
treatment status is completely random we don’t expect systematic differences between 
treated and not treated and the bias should tend to zero. A natural solution for correcting 
this bias is the comparison between treated and not treated individuals but only those with 
similar characteristics, arguing in this case that the only differences in outcomes come 
from the treatment status (the remittance reception)26. Every individual i should be 
compared (matched) with a “similar” group of individuals called the “control group for 
individual i”. This solution is not possible (neither practical) when the differences 
between individuals are due to several variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proved 
that if the exposure to treatment is random given the observed characteristics (they 
assumes that there are not selection in unobservables), it is also random for similar values 
of the one-dimensional variable p(X) = Pr(D=1|X)=E(D|X), where X is a set of pre-
                                                
25 The average treatment effect on the full sample requires additional techniques and assumptions
26 There still the bias due to unobserved systematic differences between the treated and not treated.
treatment27 observed characteristics and p(X) is the “propensity score” (PS) and it can be 
estimated using any standard probability model like probit or logit. This strong result 
implies that we can construct a control group for every treated individual using non 
treated individuals with similar propensity score instead of making multidimensional 
matching. Formally, the assumption needed to perform the propensity score matching is 
that ( , ) /T NTY Y D X , in other words, once we have conditioned on X, the effect of 
receiving remittances must be the same either the individuals are actually treated or not28. 
This assumption prevents the selection in unobserved characteristics and is a strong 
assumption in our analysis. The variables we used to perform the propensity score 
estimation are the same used in the previous OLS and Probit regressions corresponding to 
the respective outcome of interest. 
Once we have estimated the PS, there are different methods to construct the “control 
group” of every treated individual using the subsample of non treated individuals and 
measure the Average Treatment Effect on Treated29. The most popular way is to use the 
“K-nearest neighbor matching method" and consist in comparing the outcome of every 
treated individual with the outcome of k individuals among the non treated group with the 
closest estimated PS. Averaging over the treated individuals, we have the ATT 
estimation. The “Radius matching method” follows a similar idea, using as control group 
for the individual i the observations in the non treated set with an estimated PS such that 
the difference in absolute value with the PS estimated for i is less than a threshold r.  The 
“Kernel matching method” differs from the previous because it uses the full set of non 
treated individuals (relying on the common support) but it weights them with different 
values according to the distance with the PS of the treated individual i and the weights are 
given by a kernel smooth function. Formally, the estimated ATT is given by:
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Where T is the set of individuals who receives remittances (treated), NT is the set of 
individuals not receiving remittances, NT is the number of individuals receiving 
remittances, G(.) is a kernel function with  a bandwith parameter hn .
There are also several matching estimators in the literature that we don’t comment here30.
                                                
27 Note here the importance of using here the counterfactual income for a scenario of no remittances and no 
migration instead of the income net of remittances. 
28 There are some additional technical requirements that we don’t mention here. For more details see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
29 We also restrict the analysis to observations relying on the “common support”, that is observation with 
PSM estimated lower than the maximum PSM inside the opposite (treated or non treated) group and with 
estimated PSM higher than the minimum PSM of the opposite group. 
30  For a more detailed description, see Becker and Ichinos (2002).
Table 1
Remittances and Household Income Profile
R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff
Receives remittances (%) 16.2 83.8 -67.6*** 16.2 83.8 -67.6*** 5.7 94.3 -88.5*** 20.4 79.6 -59.3***
Poor (based on income before 
remittances) (%)
13.4 19.1 -5.7*** 35.0 43.9 -8.8*** 46.5 12.4 34.0*** 27.0 44.2 -17.2***
Poor (based on income after 
remittances) (%)
6.7 19.1 -12.4*** 14.5 43.9 -29.3*** 10.0 12.4 -2.4*** 19.0 44.2 -25.3***
Remittances (% of household 
income) - All households
15.5 0.0 30.5 0.0 49.3 0.0 19.0 0.0
Remittances (% of  household 
income) - Poor Households
57.7 0.0 79.9 0.0 80.4 0.0 23.0 0.0
Remittances (% of  household 
income) - Non-Poor Households
13.7 0.0 20.9 0.0 34.5 0.0 18.7 0.0
Per capita income before 
remittances
160.2 164.9 -4.7 2120.0 1374.9 745.1*** 1072.6 2589.4 -1516.8*** 1278.1 1060.2 217.9***
Per capita income after 
remittances
189.6 164.9 24.7*** 3051.9 1374.9 1677.0*** 2115.6 2589.4 -473.8*** 1578.1 1060.2 517.9***
Receives pensions (%) 12.6 7.3 5.3*** 5.7 2.2 3.6*** 6.2 11.0 -4.8*** 9.7 4.0 5.7***
Pensions (% of household 
income before remittances)
4.8 2.8 2.0** 1.7 2.3 -0.6 3.2 4.5 -1.3** 2.6 1.3 1.3**
Pensions (% of household 
income after remittances)
4.1 2.8 1.3** 1.2 2.3 -1.1 1.6 4.5 -2.8** 2.1 1.3 0.8
Variable/Country
Ecuador 2006 Honduras 2004 Nicaragua 2005Mexico 2006
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 2
Remittances and Household Demographic Profile
R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff
Household size 4.1 4.0 0.1** 5.0 4.9 0 4.0 4.0 0 4.8 5.3 -0.5***
Have children 72.4 71.3 1.1 85.4 83.3 2.1* 71.5 66.3 5.2*** 73.9 82.4 -8.5***
Number of Children (0-17 years 
old)
1.6 1.6 0.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 1.8 1.5 0.3*** 1.9 2.3 -0.4***
    0-5 years old 0.5 0.6 -0.1*** 0.7 0.8 -0.1*** 0.6 0.5 0.1*** 0.6 0.7 -0.1***
    6-12 years old 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1*** 0.8 1.0 -0.2***
    13-17 years old 0.5 0.4 0.1*** 0.7 0.6 0.1*** 0.5 0.4 0.1*** 0.6 0.7 -0.1***
Have elderly members (65+ 
years old)
25.5 16.9 8.6*** 21.5 16.0 5.5*** 28.5 19.2 9.3*** 34.9 18.0 17.0***
Number of Elderly (65+ years 
old) 
0.3 0.2 0.1*** 0.3 0.2 0.1*** 0.4 0.2 0.1*** 0.4 0.2 0.2***
Female-Headed Household 32.4 19.5 13.0*** 42.9 21.5 21.4*** 58.6 23.1 35.5*** 50.3 25.2 25.1***
Elderly-Headed Household 18.5 13.2 5.4*** 16.4 12.4 4.0*** 23.1 15.2 7.9*** 28.5 13.2 15.3***
Rural 15.2 26.2 -11.1*** 39.5 54.0 -14.5*** 48.1 21.0 27.1*** 30.6 48.1 -17.5***
Years of education, household 
head
9.0 8.4 0.6*** 5.9 4.8 1.1*** 5.4 8.0 -2.6*** 5.0 4.7 0.3**
Migrant age  33.9 31.2 2.7*** 32.6 30.4 2.2*** 33.4 31.4 2.0**
Migrant gender (male=1) 48.6 48.8 -0.2 65.4 63.1 2.4 54.7 45.3 9.3***
Migrant's years of education 12.2 12.5 -0.2 7.9 7.7 0.2 9.1 7.3 1.8***
Migrant being the former 
household head
29.1 6.6 22.5***
Migrant being the spouse of 
current head
27.6 16.7 10.8***
Nicaragua 2005Mexico 2006
Variable/Country
Ecuador 2006 Honduras 2004
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 3
Fraction of households with and without remittances and pensions (in %)
Households with at least one member aged 65+
Ecuador With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 7.6 20.3
Without pensions 14.6 57.6
Honduras With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 3.2 6.3
Without pensions 16.1 74.5
Mexico With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 1.2 30.4
Without pensions 7.2 61.2
Nicaragua With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 7.5 8.7
Without pensions 30.9 53.0
Table 4
Remittances and Pensions: Fraction of Household Income (in %)
Remittances (left) and pensions (right, in parenthesis)
Households with at least one member aged 65+
Ecuador With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 9.8 (24.7) 0.0 (30.0)
Without pensions 18.3 (0.0)
Honduras With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 21.8 (22.7) 0.0 (26.7)
Without pensions 25.4 (0.0)
Mexico With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 27.5 (18.7) 0.0 (31.4)
Without pensions 36.6 (0.0)
Nicaragua With remittances Without remittances
With pensions 15.8 (17.8) 0.0 (22.2)
Without pensions 18.6 (0.0)
Table 5
Remittances and Children- and Elderly-Related Outcomes
Variable / Country
Elderly-related Outcomes R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff
   Economic reason for not 
seeing a doctor if ill
32.3 44.0 -11.7*** 16.8 24.1 -7.3 7.8 7.7 0.0
   Regular checkups 19.7 14.8 4.9 12.3 6.5 5.8*** 4.5 3.2 1.4
   Labor participation 41.1 45.5 -4.4* 37.5 42.3 -4.7 36.4 34.5 1.9 30.0 41.8 -11.9***
   Retired people aged 55-70 32.0 27.0 5.0*** 48.2 42.2 6.0** 50.5 42.3 8.2*** 47.3 33.3 13.9***
   People 65+ living alone or 
with other elderly
22.5 32.3 -9.7*** 11.6 16.8 -5.2** 28.1 31.2 -3.1 13.3 6.1 7.2***
Health expenses to total 
consumption (%) 
12.9 10.6 2.3 14.2 11.4 2.7* 7.1 6.0 1.1 9.7 7.6 2.1**
Children-related Outcomes R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff
   School attendance  [6,12] 98.9 97.2 1.6*** 95.8 90.1 5.7*** 98.5 97.8 0.7 86.8 81.5 5.3***
   School attendance  [13,17] 86.0 77.8 8.2*** 78.4 68.9 9.5*** 76.5 75.7 0.8 75.7 67.3 8.3***
   Private education  [6,12] 40.8 26.2 14.6*** 12.5 7.0 5.5*** 3.7 8.4 -4.6*** 15.5 9.5 5.9***
   Private education  [13,17] 36.7 27.7 9.0*** 21.6 12.7 8.9*** 3.6 11.8 -8.2*** 23.8 15.9 7.9***
   Weight at birth (% 
underweight 2,5 kg.)
10.2 7.1 3.1*
   Weight for age Z-score  [0-6] -0.5 -0.7 0.2*** -0.3 -0.8 0.5***
   Height for age Z-score  [0-6] -0.8 -1.0 0.2*** -0.6 -1.3 0.7***
   Labor participation  [11-17] 23.8 29.3 -5.5*** 14.6 19.7 -5.1*** 20.1 19.0 1.1 17.3 25.6 -8.3***
   Education expenses to total 
consumption (%)
8.6 8.0 0.6 7.0 6.1 0.9** 7.1 9.3 -2.2** 5.6 5.0 0.6**
Ecuador 2006 Honduras 2004 Mexico 2006 Nicaragua 2005
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 6
Pensions and the Probability of Receiving Remittances 
Marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Age (Household Head) 0.00061 0.00004 0.00003 -0.00363 -0.0036 -0.00362
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03) (2.43)** (2.41)** (2.43)**
Age (Household Head) Squared 0.0000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005
(0.25) (0.79) (0.8) (2.94)*** (2.91)*** (2.94)***
Female household head 0.13372 0.13326 0.13322 0.17135 0.17124 0.17134
(9.44)*** (9.42)*** (9.42)*** (11.10)*** (11.09)*** (11.10)***
Married household head 0.03719 0.03753 0.03754 0.06179 0.06163 0.06177
(3.17)*** (3.21)*** (3.21)*** (4.81)*** (4.79)*** (4.80)***
0.00142 0.00162 0.00163 0.00137 0.00132 0.00136
(1.48) (1.69)* (1.70)* (1.23) (1.17) (1.21)
Rural -0.03546 -0.03657 -0.03663 0.00907 0.00899 0.00907
(4.11)*** (4.24)*** (4.25)*** (0.87) (0.86) (0.87)
Log(per capita consumption) 0.05658 0.05781 0.05789 0.09375 0.0934 0.09369
(12.01)*** (12.24)*** (12.25)*** (13.23)*** (13.17)*** (13.22)***
0.01999 0.02047 0.02047 0.02022 0.02013 0.02021
(7.28)*** (7.45)*** (7.45)*** (7.47)*** (7.44)*** (7.47)***
0.0509 0.05781 0.05803 0.0199 0.01721 0.0195
(3.69)*** (4.13)*** (4.15)*** (1.26) (1.07) (1.21)
-0.04393 0.02493
(2.62)*** (0.81)
-0.04551 0.00388
(2.71)*** (0.13)
Observations 10,849 10,849 10,849 8,124 8,124 8,124
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR chi2 541.5 548.3 548.6 569.5 569.3 570.0
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08
Maximum years of education in 
the household
HondurasEcuador
One or more members 65 years 
old and above
Dependent Variable: 
Household receives 
remittances
Number of members 15 years 
old and below
Pension-recipient elderly × (Non-
poor)
Pension-recipient elderly in the 
household
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 6 (cont.)
Pensions and the Probability of Receiving Remittances 
Marginal probabilities
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Age (Household head) 0.00058 0.00051 0.0005 -0.00229 -0.00223 -0.00222
(1.26) (1.12) (1.1) (1.15) (1.12) (1.12)
Age (Household Head) squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006
(0.34) (0.13) (0.1) (2.83)*** (2.79)*** (2.79)***
Female household head 0.14822 0.14803 0.14798 0.14166 0.14158 0.14151
(22.43)*** (22.44)*** (22.45)*** (8.72)*** (8.71)*** (8.71)***
Married household head 0.03962 0.03954 0.03947 -0.06377 -0.06407 -0.06417
(11.58)*** (11.61)*** (11.60)*** (4.09)*** (4.11)*** (4.12)***
-0.00277 -0.0027 -0.00269 -0.00086 -0.00088 -0.00089
(9.00)*** (8.77)*** (8.76)*** -0.62 -0.64 -0.64
Rural 0.05349 0.05225 0.05217 -0.05487 -0.05424 -0.05424
(15.41)*** (15.17)*** (15.16)*** (4.70)*** (4.63)*** (4.63)***
Log(per capita consumption) 0.01979 0.02038 0.02047 0.03733 0.0372 0.03704
(12.03)*** (12.42)*** (12.50)*** (4.07)*** (4.05)*** (4.03)***
0.00965 0.00981 0.00981 0.00191 0.00187 0.00187
(10.68)*** (10.89)*** (10.91)*** (0.57) (0.56) (0.55)
0.01108 0.01627 0.01655 0.03411 0.03222 0.03196
(2.24)** (3.15)*** (3.20)*** (1.92)* (1.79)* (1.78)*
-0.01805 0.01968
(3.66)*** (0.6)
-0.01955 0.02613
(4.03)*** (0.74)
Observations 20,524 20,524 20,524 6,861 6,861 6,861
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR chi2 1129.3 1141.0 1145.1 773.3 773.4 773.4
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12
Mexico
One or more members 65 years 
old and above
Dependent Variable: 
Household receives 
remittances
Number of members 15 years 
old and below
Nicaragua
Maximum years of education in 
the household
Pension-recipient elderly in the 
household
Pension-recipient elderly × (Non-
poor)
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 7 
Remittances and Co-residence of Elderly and Children
Probit marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0,13836 0,1026 0,06019 -0,07464
[5.82]*** [3.40]*** [2.37]** [3.09]***
Receives remittances X poor 0,23187 0,24286 0,06991 0,11501
[4.10]*** [4.29]*** [1.83]* [2.99]***
Receives pensions -0,06524 -0,05769 0,01259 0,02363 0,00038 0,00055 -0,00559 -0,00323
[2.37]** [2.09]** [0.26] [0.49] [0.02] [0.03] [0.13] [0.08]
Working -0,01686 -0,01374 -0,02114 -0,01228 -0,04813 -0,04816 -0,05216 -0,04194
[0.78] [0.64] [0.76] [0.44] [3.11]*** [3.11]*** [1.86]* [1.49]
Age of head -0,00897 -0,00901 -0,00486 -0,00438 -0,00612 -0,00611 -0,00322 -0,00376
[6.36]*** [6.38]*** [2.64]*** [2.38]** [6.28]*** [6.26]*** [1.99]** [2.34]**
Female -0,03598 -0,02986 -0,01823 -0,01604 -0,04848 -0,04833 -0,0302 -0,03277
[1.70]* [1.41] [0.66] [0.58] [3.22]*** [3.21]*** [1.10] [1.19]
Married head -0,07585 -0,07555 -0,05132 -0,05085 -0,06785 -0,06805 -0,01799 -0,02498
[3.63]*** [3.62]*** [1.86]* [1.83]* [4.69]*** [4.70]*** [0.70] [0.98]
Primary school completed -0,01054 0,00045 0,06445 0,0645 -0,0683 -0,06813 -0,04158 -0,03633
[0.44] [0.02] [1.43] [1.43] [3.70]*** [3.69]*** [0.98] [0.86]
Secondary school incompleted -0,08305 -0,08042 -0,14442 -0,15675 -0,1245 -0,12452 -0,08273 -0,07338
[2.29]** [2.23]** [1.50] [1.65]* [4.87]*** [4.88]*** [1.17] [1.06]
Superior school completed -0,20933 -0,21338 -0,23772 -0,23818 -0,17866 -0,17888 -0,11717 -0,11101
[4.10]*** [4.22]*** [2.90]*** [2.93]*** [5.30]*** [5.31]*** [0.85] [0.80]
Rural -0,02271 -0,03504 -0,00653 -0,02515 -0,01657 -0,016 -0,04744 -0,04534
[1.03] [1.59] [0.23] [0.89] [1.10] [1.06] [1.86]* [1.79]*
House ownership 0,05353 0,05398 0,00774 0,01237 0,03272 0,03361 0,04084 0,04618
[2.04]** [2.08]** [0.25] [0.39] [1.70]* [1.75]* [1.09] [1.23]
Superior school incompleted -0,11527 -0,11976 -0,06495 -0,05735 -0,20139 -0,20213 -0,22182 -0,21453
[1.44] [1.51] [0.38] [0.33] [3.58]*** [3.60]*** [0.64] [0.58]
Secondary school completed -0,15356 -0,14892 -0,17185 -0,17229 -0,11407 -0,11409
[2.93]*** [2.83]*** [4.89]*** [4.90]*** [1.13] [1.13]
Observations 2597 2597 1678 1678 5039 5039 1774 1774
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02
Dependent Variable: Co-residence
Ecuador Mexico NicaraguaHonduras
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 8
Remittances and Elderly Labor Participation
Marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances -0,03422 -0,03806 -0,10745 -0,12918
[1.31] [1.22] [3.92]*** [4.22]***
Receives remittances X Poor -0,13996 -0,16199 -0,1268 -0,12921
[2.29]** [3.10]*** [3.13]*** [3.01]***
Age -0,02766 -0,0276 -0,02199 -0,02226 -0,02084 -0,02077 -0,02379 -0,02444
[16.83]*** [16.84]*** [10.46]*** [10.51]*** [16.70]*** [16.68]*** [11.36]*** [11.75]***
Female -0,2501 -0,25156 -0,25496 -0,25624 -0,40697 -0,40654 -0,45526 -0,46691
[11.03]*** [11.09]*** [9.47]*** [9.51]*** [24.31]*** [24.29]*** [16.50]*** [17.04]***
Married 0,04977 0,05065 0,03861 0,03855 -0,04825 -0,04738 0,04338 0,03753
[2.18]** [2.21]** [1.41] [1.40] [2.83]*** [2.78]*** [1.53] [1.33]
Receives pension -0,13767 -0,14157 -0,17328 -0,17518 -0,29088 -0,29037 -0,29755 -0,29573
[4.56]*** [4.69]*** [3.91]*** [3.95]*** [15.14]*** [15.10]*** [6.15]*** [6.04]***
Receives transfers other than pension -0,11858 -0,11874 -0,03658 -0,03938 -0,1693 -0,17056 0,14545 0,10478
[5.29]*** [5.30]*** [1.34] [1.44] [8.06]*** [8.10]*** [4.59]*** [3.57]***
Working adults to total household members -0,09861 -0,09605 -0,06376 -0,0614 -0,10401 -0,10238 -0,02195 -0,01926
[6.09]*** [5.93]*** [6.19]*** [6.01]*** [11.17]*** [11.08]*** [3.36]*** [2.96]***
Rural 0,15439 0,15927 0,10799 0,1177 0,13043 0,12919 0,07135 0,08733
[6.45]*** [6.67]*** [3.83]*** [4.15]*** [7.44]*** [7.35]*** [2.56]** [3.17]***
Semiskilled -0,08237 -0,08272 -0,07772 -0,08118 0,02081 0,02233 0,11953 0,10496
[2.36]** [2.37]** [1.55] [1.62] [0.73] [0.78] [1.17] [1.05]
Skilled 0,06091 0,06204 -0,08737 -0,09166 0,03842 0,03948 0,26977 0,2601
[1.23] [1.25] [1.21] [1.28] [1.01] [1.04] [1.62] [1.51]
House ownership 0,00384 0,00186 0,04461 0,04206 -0,00799 -0,00938 0,0145 0,01047
[0.13] [0.06] [1.38] [1.30] [0.35] [0.41] [0.34] [0.25]
Observations 2570 2570 1632 1632 4698 4698 1768 1768
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0,2 0,2 0,16 0,17 0,25 0,24 0,28 0,28
Mexico NicaraguaDependent Variable: Being elderly (aged 
65+) and active
Ecuador Honduras
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 9
Remittances and Early Retirement
Marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0,03751 0,06147 0,10533 0,12254
[2.11]** [2.14]** [3.74]*** [4.39]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0,12363 0,10491 0,16758 0,14458
[2.57]** [1.92]* [3.75]*** [3.44]***
Age 0,01596 0,01594 0,00897 0,00881 0,01598 0,01608 0,017 0,01722
[10.04]*** [10.02]*** [3.61]*** [3.55]*** [10.60]*** [10.65]*** [7.23]*** [7.33]***
Female 0,31924 0,31952 0,43315 0,43374 0,5094 0,50933 0,5709 0,58103
[19.48]*** [19.50]*** [18.92]*** [18.94]*** [34.74]*** [34.77]*** [23.56]*** [24.07]***
Married 0,02994 0,03051 0,00103 0,00333 0,14651 0,14659 0,01687 0,0252
[1.82]* [1.86]* [0.04] [0.13] [9.27]*** [9.28]*** [0.67] [1.00]
Receives pension 0,23284 0,23798 0,32682 0,33185 0,47183 0,47104 0,46466 0,47043
[7.29]*** [7.46]*** [6.04]*** [6.18]*** [21.77]*** [21.75]*** [7.09]*** [7.24]***
Receives transfers other than 
pension
0,08337 0,08172 0,1002 0,1007 0,19558 0,19763 -0,07169 -0,03944
[5.00]*** [4.90]*** [3.91]*** [3.93]*** [7.79]*** [7.86]*** [2.59]*** [1.53]
Working adults to total household 
members
0,05107 0,0484 0,04998 0,04736 0,10049 0,09906 0,02519 0,02322
[6.60]*** [6.26]*** [6.14]*** [5.85]*** [16.06]*** [15.84]*** [4.86]*** [4.50]***
Rural -0,09131 -0,09404 0,03321 0,02712 -0,08907 -0,09063 0,04073 0,02987
[5.51]*** [5.70]*** [1.32] [1.08] [5.83]*** [5.92]*** [1.71]* [1.26]
Semiskilled 0,04692 0,04899 -0,00021 0,00187 -0,0563 -0,05716 -0,1081 -0,10613
[2.33]** [2.43]** [0.01] [0.05] [3.00]*** [3.05]*** [1.80]* [1.78]*
Skilled -0,09489 -0,09377 -0,08264 -0,08615 -0,09276 -0,09395 -0,21188 -0,20725
[3.95]*** [3.87]*** [1.40] [1.46] [3.57]*** [3.62]*** [2.94]*** [2.87]***
House ownership 0,01635 0,01705 0,01093 0,01291 0,00819 0,0102 0,00935 0,01233
[0.86] [0.90] [0.40] [0.47] [0.43] [0.53] [0.26] [0.35]
Observations 3400 3400 2313 2313 6709 6709 2404 2404
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0,2 0,2 0,17 0,17 0,27 0,27 0,33 0,33
Mexico NicaraguaEcuador HondurasDependent Variable: Being 
retired if aged [55-70]
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 10
Remittances and Household Health Expenditures
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0.19262 0.083
[3.30]*** [0.79]
Receives remittances X Poor 0.29976 0.01841
[2.28]** [0.09]
Log (Per capita remittances) 0.0766 -0.0894
[2.07]** [1.17]
Log (Per capita remittances) X Poor 0.09254 -0.0035
[1.86]* [0.06]
Receives pensions -0.02423 -0.02541 0.10524 0.07882 -0.07209 -0.0676 -0.16371 -0.15456
[0.34] [0.35] [0.78] [0.59] [0.48] [0.45] [0.72] [0.68]
Working -0.16076 -0.15663 0.07422 0.09353 -0.30326 -0.30251 0.21608 0.22995
[2.83]*** [2.75]*** [0.65] [0.82] [3.13]*** [3.13]*** [1.11] [1.17]
Age 0.01902 0.0192 0.02075 0.02115 0.02152 0.02166 0.0328 0.03327
[5.58]*** [5.63]*** [3.14]*** [3.22]*** [3.53]*** [3.57]*** [2.94]*** [2.94]***
Female 0.18755 0.19388 0.21257 0.21719 0.16334 0.16386 0.32823 0.33074
[3.35]*** [3.46]*** [1.80]* [1.82]* [1.69]* [1.70]* [1.71]* [1.73]*
Married 0.43508 0.43306 0.38324 0.38644 0.42469 0.42493 0.43751 0.43477
[7.92]*** [7.87]*** [3.40]*** [3.41]*** [4.41]*** [4.42]*** [2.08]** [2.05]**
Household head -0.28938 -0.28823 -0.35689 -0.32426 -0.21339 -0.21714 -0.02486 -0.0297
[4.21]*** [4.19]*** [2.43]** [2.20]** [1.61] [1.63] [0.08] [0.09]
Rural -0.01764 -0.0173 0.13883 0.14564 0.45827 0.46176 0.49565 0.43839
[0.28] [0.28] [1.04] [1.09] [3.77]*** [3.79]*** [1.63] [1.42]
Log(pc consumption) 0.85265 0.87637 0.77813 0.8983 1.53067 1.54404 1.819 1.66623
[22.79]*** [23.54]*** [8.62]*** [10.63]*** [16.94]*** [16.79]*** [7.81]*** [7.28]***
Household size 0.09331 0.09902 0.06 0.06195 0.17162 0.1728 0.24216 0.24438
[6.48]*** [6.87]*** [2.25]** [2.34]** [8.56]*** [8.62]*** [5.30]*** [5.15]***
House ownership 0.07347 0.06344 0.0727 0.06008 0.09306 0.09106 0.23276 0.23706
[1.10] [0.96] [0.59] [0.49] [0.81] [0.79] [0.83] [0.84]
Observations 2441 2441 533 533 1275 1275 278 278
Method
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44
Log (Household Health 
Expenditures)
HondurasEcuador
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 10 (cont.)
Remittances and Household Health Expenditures
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Receives remittances 0.27462 0.10254
[2.83]*** [1.51]
Receives remittances X Poor 0.16197 0.20696
[0.96] [1.92]*
Log (Per capita remittances) 0.24439 0.14079
[1.68]* [2.19]**
Log (Per capita remittances) X Poor -0.01014 0.0653
[0.30] [2.03]**
Receives pensions -0.08817 -0.09836 -0.46397 -0.51482 0.10117 0.10773 0.09701 0.09221
[1.25] [1.40] [1.56] [1.69]* [0.96] [1.01] [0.57] [0.54]
Working -0.10055 -0.10402 -0.25793 -0.28402 -0.10536 -0.10467 0.02901 0.03724
[1.50] [1.55] [1.12] [1.23] [1.29] [1.28] [0.22] [0.28]
Age 0.00681 0.00685 -0.00141 -0.00124 0.00636 0.00656 0.00554 0.00542
[1.69]* [1.70]* [0.12] [0.10] [1.45] [1.50] [0.83] [0.81]
Female 0.04299 0.0429 0.05782 0.03018 0.08781 0.09524 0.16184 0.17517
[0.69] [0.68] [0.25] [0.13] [1.11] [1.21] [1.24] [1.34]
Married 0.35803 0.35733 0.30664 0.29976 0.24961 0.24691 0.2075 0.19962
[5.99]*** [5.98]*** [1.37] [1.34] [3.44]*** [3.41]*** [1.74]* [1.66]*
Household head -0.04133 -0.04553 -0.0176 -0.03333 -0.3034 -0.28573 -0.06008 -0.00883
[0.56] [0.62] [0.07] [0.13] [2.29]** [2.16]** [0.33] [0.05]
Rural 0.22863 0.2489 0.54916 0.65233 0.03915 0.04242 0.075 0.0814
[3.24]*** [3.53]*** [2.62]*** [3.21]*** [0.50] [0.54] [0.57] [0.62]
Log(pc consumption) 1.14575 1.15766 1.21311 1.42359 0.90639 0.95701 0.6077 0.98166
[26.11]*** [26.46]*** [5.55]*** [7.05]*** [10.22]*** [10.52]*** [3.54]*** [5.51]***
Household size 0.17354 0.17525 0.20504 0.17847 0.14138 0.14423 0.17193 0.17624
[10.45]*** [10.59]*** [3.80]*** [3.37]*** [10.37]*** [10.54]*** [7.73]*** [7.49]***
House ownership 0.25941 0.25684 0.11442 0.11581 0.28514 0.28557 0.4549 0.45097
[3.28]*** [3.25]*** [0.40] [0.40] [2.87]*** [2.88]*** [2.51]** [2.49]**
Observations 3170 3170 260 260 1548 1548 576 576
Method
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with 
Wu-
Hausman 
correction
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35
Log (Household Health 
Expenditures)
Mexico Nicaragua
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 11
Remittances and Children School Attendance
Marginal probabilities
Dependent Variable: School attendance if 
aged [11-17]
Ecuador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
Receives remittances 0,02628 0,02758 -0,00041 0,04598
[2.98]*** [2.69]*** [0.03] [3.38]***
Age -0,03991 -0,06019 -0,09184 -0,09119
[19.09]*** [21.26]*** [32.57]*** [25.26]***
Female -0,02189 -0,0335 -0,02313 -0,02476
[3.35]*** [4.21]*** [3.40]*** [2.15]**
Working -0,10634 -0,19155 -0,22612 -0,17215
[13.56]*** [14.87]*** [23.71]*** [12.64]***
Oldest child 0,02308 0,01149 0,06704 0,07141
[2.58]*** [1.11] [6.87]*** [5.21]***
Number of children of 5 years old or below 0,00897 -0,00761 0,02079 0,00226
[1.63] [1.41] [3.46]*** [0.31]
Number of children between 6-17 years old 0,02391 0,01275 0,03761 0,03361
[5.65]*** [3.05]*** [8.73]*** [5.76]***
Age of household head 0,00078 0,00081 0,00132 0,00025
[2.42]** [2.39]** [3.86]*** [0.53]
Female-headed household 0,0081 -0,00556 0,02298 -0,04163
[0.63] [0.40] [2.04]** [2.03]**
Married household head 0,03742 -0,0144 0,02424 0,01955
[2.66]*** [1.06] [1.89]* [0.97]
Maximum years of education in the 
household
0,02638 0,02675 0,04707 0,0454
[18.83]*** [15.42]*** [26.18]*** [22.12]***
Rural -0,02823 -0,00852 -0,00849 -0,04884
[3.66]*** [0.93] [1.16] [3.99]***
Household size -0,02279 -0,0112 -0,03243 -0,02227
[7.32]*** [3.94]*** [10.52]*** [5.97]***
House ownership 0,02851 0,01694 0,02892 0,03493
[3.66]*** [1.89]* [3.26]*** [2.41]**
Observations 6731 6317 10998 6973
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0,3 0,34 0,35 0,27
Table 12
Remittances and Children Attendance to Private School
Marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0.07395 0.05618
[4.97]*** [5.59]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0.12531 0.11089
[3.21]*** [3.91]***
Log (pc remmitances) 0.03284 0.02839
[3.55]*** [3.12]***
Log(pc remittances) X Poor 0.03839 0.00861
[2.32]** [1.09]
Age -0.00047 -0.00049 -0.00081 -0.00137 0.0093 0.00962 0.01237 0.0127
[0.15] [0.16] [0.10] [0.17] [4.44]*** [4.55]*** [1.75]* [1.78]*
Female -0.00604 -0.0051 -0.00155 -0.00537 0.01876 0.01872 0.03006 0.02845
[0.54] [0.46] [0.05] [0.18] [2.55]** [2.54]** [1.20] [1.14]
Oldest child 0.0491 0.0494 0.04363 0.047 0.03415 0.03455 0.05423 0.0588
[3.39]*** [3.41]*** [1.17] [1.27] [3.88]*** [3.92]*** [1.78]* [1.92]*
Number of children of 5 years old or below 0.00905 0.00439 -0.02826 -0.04356 0.0046 0.00363 0.02397 0.0164
[0.80] [0.39] [0.92] [1.45] [0.67] [0.52] [1.03] [0.70]
Number of children between 6-17 years old -0.00513 -0.00908 -0.02249 -0.02916 0.00454 0.0035 -0.00078 -0.00377
[0.61] [1.09] [1.08] [1.41] [1.04] [0.79] [0.06] [0.29]
Age of household head 0.0001 0.00009 0.00096 0.00104 0.00013 0.0001 -0.00011 -0.00022
[0.16] [0.14] [0.68] [0.75] [0.39] [0.28] [0.11] [0.21]
Female-headed household -0.00132 0.00236 -0.01512 0.00376 -0.00732 -0.00527 -0.02346 -0.00941
[0.06] [0.10] [0.35] [0.08] [0.58] [0.42] [0.65] [0.26]
Married household head 0.04352 0.03843 0.09585 0.09133 0.00188 -0.00244 -0.01469 -0.01505
[1.92]* [1.67]* [2.27]** [2.11]** [0.14] [0.18] [0.40] [0.40]
0.0113 0.01126 0.00853 0.00728 0.0151 0.01496 0.01985 0.02086
[5.97]*** [5.95]*** [1.71]* [1.44] [11.37]*** [11.18]*** [4.19]*** [4.37]***
Rural -0.06369 -0.06519 -0.16316 -0.167 -0.00248 -0.00456 -0.08887 -0.09057
[4.45]*** [4.56]*** [4.14]*** [4.30]*** [0.23] [0.41] [2.36]** [2.38]**
Household size -0.00405 0.00007 0.02346 0.02854 -0.00595 -0.00432 0.00184 0.00251
[0.74] [0.01] [1.74]* [2.13]** [1.98]** [1.41] [0.22] [0.30]
Log (pc income before remittances) 0.10367 0.10985 0.11006 0.13736 0.05335 0.05875 0.0678 0.08077
[11.61]*** [11.77]*** [5.12]*** [5.72]*** [9.53]*** [9.79]*** [4.60]*** [4.16]***
House ownership -0.02363 -0.02437 -0.02469 -0.0278 0.00807 0.00919 -0.00607 -0.00069
[1.81]* [1.87]* [0.70] [0.79] [0.98] [1.11] [0.21] [0.02]
Observations 5615 5615 1022 1022 5218 5218 978 978
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.3 0.29 0.21 0.2
Dependent Variable: Private school 
attendance if aged [11-17]
Maximum years of education in the 
household
HondurasEcuador
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 12 (cont.)
Remittances and Children Attendance to Private School
Marginal probabilities
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Receives remittances 0.00703 0.00929
[0.77] [1.13]
Receives remittances X Poor 0.04651 0.03239
[1.98]** [1.99]**
Log (pc remmitances) 0.0004 0.02906
[0.55] [2.93]***
Log(pc remittances) X Poor 0.00025 0.01915
[0.83] [2.99]***
Age 0.00495 0.00499 0.00052 0.00048 0.0059 0.00596 0.01527 0.01585
[5.27]*** [5.25]*** [1.32] [1.21] [3.15]*** [3.20]*** [2.97]*** [3.03]***
Female 0.00898 0.00902 0.00184 0.00175 0.02044 0.02029 0.0243 0.02729
[2.83]*** [2.81]*** [1.33] [1.28] [3.11]*** [3.11]*** [1.33] [1.48]
Oldest child 0.01662 0.01681 0.0017 0.00176 0.03342 0.03295 0.02204 0.02105
[3.96]*** [3.98]*** [0.95] [1.02] [3.97]*** [3.93]*** [0.95] [0.90]
Number of children of 5 years old or below 0.00429 0.00427 -0.00125 -0.00128 0.00842 0.00782 -0.00316 -0.00687
[1.14] [1.13] [0.98] [1.02] [1.57] [1.47] [0.22] [0.48]
Number of children between 6-17 years old 0.00886 0.00883 -0.00192 -0.00196 0.00462 0.00411 -0.00292 -0.00488
[3.67]*** [3.63]*** [1.88]* [1.96]** [1.14] [1.03] [0.29] [0.48]
Age of household head 0.00083 0.00084 0.00002 0.00002 0.00036 0.00036 0.00004 -0.00007
[4.62]*** [4.63]*** [0.43] [0.34] [1.23] [1.23] [0.07] [0.10]
Female-headed household 0.0109 0.01051 0.00296 0.003 0.00603 0.00685 0.01621 0.02795
[1.81]* [1.77]* [1.93]* [2.04]** [0.54] [0.61] [0.58] [1.00]
Married household head 0.00437 0.00378 0.00009 0.00015 0.00381 0.00346 0.02906 0.02857
[0.75] [0.65] [0.05] [0.10] [0.33] [0.30] [1.05] [1.02]
0.00544 0.00543 0.00039 0.00038 0.01286 0.01274 0.01768 0.01713
[9.06]*** [8.94]*** [1.30] [1.30] [12.08]*** [12.05]*** [5.81]*** [5.52]***
Rural -0.02011 -0.02034 -0.00422 -0.00391 -0.04515 -0.0453 -0.07686 -0.08291
[4.36]*** [4.38]*** [2.42]** [2.38]** [5.72]*** [5.78]*** [3.35]*** [3.62]***
Household size -0.00568 -0.00559 0.00021 0.0002 -0.00466 -0.00437 0.00221 0.00194
[3.34]*** [3.26]*** [0.35] [0.36] [1.98]** [1.88]* [0.40] [0.35]
Log (pc income before remittances) 0.05342 0.05454 0.0027 0.00319 0.05142 0.05375 0.04912 0.10493
[15.31]*** [15.25]*** [2.87]*** [2.59]*** [10.09]*** [10.30]*** [2.85]*** [5.51]***
House ownership -0.0087 -0.00889 0.00158 0.00162 0.00658 0.00631 -0.00708 -0.01376
[2.10]** [2.13]** [1.03] [1.13] [0.69] [0.67] [0.26] [0.51]
Observations 10216 10216 505 505 5078 5078 1106 1106
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23
Maximum years of education in the 
household
Dependent Variable: Private school 
attendance if aged [11-17]
Mexico Nicaragua
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 13
Remittances and Education Expenditures
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0.21842 0.09109
[10.05]*** [3.59]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0.19617 -0.05434
[4.46]*** [1.19]
Log (pc remmitances) 0.06193 0.07443
[5.33]*** [4.14]***
Log(pc remittances) X Poor 0.04338 -0.03774
[3.03]*** [4.24]***
Number of children in primary school 0.14547 0.14301 0.18477 0.17368 0.22538 0.22646 0.17543 0.18104
[20.85]*** [20.37]*** [10.36]*** [9.54]*** [25.29]*** [25.35]*** [9.00]*** [9.15]***
Number of children in secondary school 0.3194 0.32034 0.30598 0.30296 0.45969 0.46303 0.46005 0.46417
[36.37]*** [36.17]*** [14.34]*** [14.24]*** [41.58]*** [41.90]*** [20.30]*** [21.45]***
Attendance to private school 0.90865 0.92008 0.86977 0.89598 1.03697 1.04118 0.98541 0.99441
[44.22]*** [44.69]*** [19.23]*** [19.92]*** [32.14]*** [32.32]*** [16.80]*** [16.91]***
Maximum years of education in the 
household
0.11529 0.11716 0.11876 0.1209 0.14396 0.14434 0.12297 0.11964
[47.24]*** [48.02]*** [19.54]*** [20.06]*** [40.12]*** [40.23]*** [15.30]*** [14.65]***
Female-headed household -0.0895 -0.07289 -0.03728 -0.00968 0.05373 0.07339 0.10535 0.20218
[4.19]*** [3.37]*** [0.92] [0.23] [2.41]** [3.30]*** [2.30]** [4.44]***
Rural -0.29086 -0.29932 -0.18604 -0.1926 -0.26343 -0.26509 -0.14348 -0.11312
[16.03]*** [16.44]*** [3.74]*** [3.84]*** [10.29]*** [10.32]*** [2.44]** [1.91]*
House ownership 0.03537 0.03884 0.03354 0.0434 0.03961 0.04311 0.08723 0.07841
[2.11]** [2.31]** [0.83] [1.07] [1.83]* [1.99]** [1.83]* [1.63]
Observations 11544 11544 1939 1939 8329 8329 1507 1507
Method
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.55
Ecuador HondurasDependent Variable: Log (Education 
expenditures)
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 13 (cont.)
Remittances and Education Expenditures
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Receives remittances 0.14085 0.09282
[3.87]*** [3.88]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0.12735 -0.09982
[2.76]*** [2.84]***
Log (pc remmitances) 0.1826 0.1158
[4.79]*** [6.10]***
Log(pc remittances) X Poor -0.00258 -0.06258
[0.22] [5.84]***
Number of children in primary school 0.10987 0.1097 0.13348 0.08784 0.22238 0.22426 0.24784 0.25045
[12.23]*** [12.20]*** [3.63]*** [2.53]** [26.77]*** [26.72]*** [15.11]*** [15.40]***
Number of children in secondary school 0.34715 0.34775 0.34901 0.3007 0.48687 0.48831 0.43358 0.44686
[34.15]*** [34.20]*** [7.74]*** [6.81]*** [39.40]*** [39.35]*** [18.80]*** [19.06]***
Attendance to private school 1.34526 1.34472 1.08087 1.08634 0.80218 0.80295 0.85768 0.8961
[45.01]*** [44.97]*** [8.20]*** [8.16]*** [27.71]*** [27.68]*** [16.07]*** [16.69]***
Maximum years of education in the 
household
0.10352 0.10354 0.11278 0.1137 0.13556 0.13512 0.13948 0.13545
[36.18]*** [36.14]*** [9.23]*** [8.95]*** [39.37]*** [39.09]*** [20.11]*** [19.04]***
Female-headed household -0.01649 -0.00646 -0.06007 0.11184 -0.06839 -0.0351 -0.03537 0.03406
[0.75] [0.29] [0.74] [1.46] [2.96]*** [1.57] [0.81] [0.82]
Rural -0.39944 -0.39668 -0.28908 -0.23592 -0.17873 -0.18425 -0.14647 -0.13066
[19.52]*** [19.42]*** [4.26]*** [3.45]*** [8.25]*** [8.54]*** [2.97]*** [2.60]***
House ownership -0.01338 -0.01224 -0.30505 -0.28447 0.0399 0.03804 0.01059 -0.01111
[0.68] [0.62] [4.21]*** [3.91]*** [1.61] [1.54] [0.21] [0.22]
Observations 16862 16862 1099 1099 9239 9239 1891 1891
Method
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
OLS with Wu-
Hausman 
correction
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.5 0.5 0.53 0.53
Dependent Variable: Log (Education 
expenditures)
Mexico Nicaragua
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 14
Remittances and Child Labor
Marginal probabilities
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances -0.04052 -0.03704
[2.45]** [3.81]***
Receives remittances X Poor -0.13792 -0.05494
[4.70]*** [4.12]***
Log (pc remmitances) -0.01943 -0.00307
[2.50]** [0.69]
Log(pc remittances) X Poor -0.04952 -0.00625
[4.32]*** [2.26]**
Age 0.06656 0.06675 0.06183 0.06328 0.04606 0.04592 0.03 0.02966
[19.45]*** [19.48]*** [8.42]*** [8.64]*** [20.08]*** [20.18]*** [6.37]*** [6.40]***
Female -0.13973 -0.14017 -0.09191 -0.09069 -0.14762 -0.14719 -0.10165 -0.1011
[11.72]*** [11.75]*** [3.55]*** [3.51]*** [17.51]*** [17.50]*** [6.26]*** [6.28]***
Oldest child -0.05804 -0.05961 -0.06859 -0.07655 0.00903 0.00844 0.01329 0.01133
[4.04]*** [4.14]*** [2.15]** [2.39]** [0.99] [0.93] [0.71] [0.61]
Number of children of 5 years old or below 0.03675 0.03726 0.00903 0.01586 0.0277 0.0277 0.01666 0.01811
[7.35]*** [7.45]*** [0.74] [1.31] [9.64]*** [9.65]*** [3.18]*** [3.43]***
Age of household head -0.00096 -0.00096 -0.00134 -0.00129 0.00004 0.00004 0.00015 0.00022
[1.74]* [1.73]* [1.36] [1.30] [0.14] [0.14] [0.33] [0.49]
Female-headed household 0.02009 0.03035 -0.013 0.00684 0.01422 0.0145 -0.00892 -0.00198
[0.83] [1.24] [0.37] [0.19] [1.04] [1.06] [0.47] [0.11]
Married household head 0.03024 0.03702 0.00794 0.02434 -0.00044 0.00091 -0.012 -0.00629
[1.31] [1.60] [0.23] [0.70] [0.03] [0.07] [0.61] [0.33]
Maximum years of education in the household -0.02892 -0.02977 -0.0239 -0.02727 -0.01747 -0.01805 -0.00886 -0.00964
[15.65]*** [16.09]*** [6.01]*** [6.57]*** [11.76]*** [12.22]*** [3.21]*** [3.44]***
Number of working adults to total household 
members
-0.04119 -0.03977 0.02055 0.0277 -0.03348 -0.03233 -0.03094 -0.02751
[7.42]*** [7.26]*** [1.46] [2.00]** [11.92]*** [11.72]*** [4.68]*** [4.31]***
Rural 0.17255 0.17397 0.14535 0.15226 0.05148 0.05265 0.0474 0.05267
[12.38]*** [12.48]*** [4.30]*** [4.49]*** [5.56]*** [5.69]*** [2.47]** [2.77]***
House ownership 0.06111 0.05965 0.01141 0.00253 -0.0043 -0.00616 -0.00629 -0.00924
[4.47]*** [4.36]*** [0.38] [0.08] [0.49] [0.71] [0.40] [0.60]
Observations 6721 6721 1164 1164 6359 6359 1129 1129
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.26
Dependent Variable: Working if aged [11-17]
HondurasEcuador
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 14 (cont.)
Remittances and Child Labor 
Marginal probabilities
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Receives remittances -0.02934 -0.03623
[1.88]* [2.54]**
Receives remittances X Poor -0.02642 -0.02807
[1.21] [1.45]
Log (pc remmitances) -0.00359 -0.03183
[0.21] [3.49]***
Log(pc remittances) X Poor -0.0041 -0.00576
[0.74] [1.11]
Age 0.0677 0.06778 0.07717 0.07701 0.06466 0.06489 0.05162 0.0532
[24.87]*** [24.89]*** [6.30]*** [6.30]*** [19.12]*** [19.20]*** [8.30]*** [8.49]***
Female -0.15039 -0.15022 -0.18514 -0.18352 -0.33343 -0.33311 -0.24231 -0.24289
[19.16]*** [19.15]*** [5.77]*** [5.72]*** [28.91]*** [28.89]*** [10.72]*** [10.71]***
Oldest child -0.04054 -0.0406 -0.11282 -0.11313 0.00146 0.00003 0.01096 0.00164
[4.11]*** [4.11]*** [2.64]*** [2.67]*** [0.11] [0.00] [0.46] [0.07]
Number of children of 5 years old or below 0.03083 0.03076 0.01048 0.01137 0.01963 0.02007 0.01913 0.02791
[9.04]*** [9.03]*** [0.84] [0.96] [5.10]*** [5.21]*** [2.50]** [3.71]***
Age of household head -0.00046 -0.00049 0.00276 0.00281 -0.0003 -0.00039 -0.00069 -0.00047
[1.29] [1.35] [1.87]* [1.95]* [0.66] [0.88] [0.89] [0.61]
Female-headed household 0.01371 0.01054 -0.00509 -0.00192 -0.0323 -0.03431 -0.08686 -0.09167
[1.03] [0.80] [0.14] [0.06] [1.61] [1.72]* [2.60]*** [2.74]***
Married household head -0.00703 -0.00869 -0.00272 -0.00024 -0.03253 -0.02926 -0.05744 -0.04972
[0.51] [0.63] [0.07] [0.01] [1.57] [1.42] [1.73]* [1.50]
Maximum years of education in the household -0.02161 -0.02165 -0.01799 -0.01895 -0.02163 -0.02187 -0.01592 -0.01933
[15.24]*** [15.25]*** [2.62]*** [2.76]*** [11.78]*** [11.87]*** [4.75]*** [5.77]***
Number of working adults to total household 
members
-0.04144 -0.04119 -0.0002 0.00196 -0.01975 -0.01964 -0.01857 -0.01986
[13.36]*** [13.36]*** [0.02] [0.20] [7.52]*** [7.47]*** [2.93]*** [3.03]***
Rural 0.07424 0.07326 0.11624 0.11859 0.12551 0.12782 0.10078 0.10881
[8.33]*** [8.24]*** [3.37]*** [3.46]*** [9.78]*** [9.96]*** [4.18]*** [4.50]***
House ownership 0.0122 0.01202 0.05033 0.04762 0.0622 0.06323 0.02702 0.03589
[1.27] [1.25] [1.31] [1.24] [4.45]*** [4.53]*** [1.05] [1.40]
Observations 10878 10878 726 726 6957 6957 1399 1399
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.26
Dependent Variable: Working if aged [11-17]
Mexico Nicaragua
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 15
Remittances and Weight-to-Age Z-Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0.05824 0.14384
[1.19] [2.58]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0.08657 0.29054
[0.75] [3.04]***
Log (pc remmitances) 0.05524 0.0415
[1.94]* [1.29]
Log(pc remittances) X Poor 0.06559 0.03512
[1.16] [1.32]
Age 0.02216 0.0221 -0.00913 -0.00752 -0.15374 -0.15407 -0.12449 -0.12574
[1.86]* [1.86]* [0.28] [0.23] [11.49]*** [11.52]*** [3.43]*** [3.47]***
Female 0.04358 0.04371 0.25146 0.25348 -0.04827 -0.04944 0.01356 0.00385
[1.32] [1.32] [2.80]*** [2.80]*** [1.31] [1.34] [0.14] [0.04]
Oldest child 0.03025 0.02835 0.10809 0.12687 -0.00763 -0.00811 -0.05453 -0.04458
[0.68] [0.64] [0.90] [1.07] [0.15] [0.16] [0.41] [0.34]
Number of children under 10 years old -0.0826 -0.08259 -0.07506 -0.07463 -0.10549 -0.10373 -0.12623 -0.12618
[4.88]*** [4.88]*** [1.54] [1.52] [6.05]*** [5.96]*** [2.75]*** [2.78]***
Age of household head 0.00241 0.00248 -0.0021 -0.00192 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017 0.00209
[1.69]* [1.74]* [0.60] [0.55] [0.91] [0.98] [0.45] [0.55]
Female-headed household 0.26234 0.26497 0.12459 0.14258 0.20818 0.19451 0.05709 0.06434
[3.04]*** [3.08]*** [0.70] [0.82] [2.79]*** [2.60]*** [0.36] [0.41]
Married household head 0.23833 0.23727 0.17572 0.16528 0.1702 0.15609 0.17887 0.18171
[2.65]*** [2.64]*** [0.93] [0.87] [2.19]** [2.00]** [1.08] [1.10]
Maximum years of education in the household 0.03811 0.03851 0.01887 0.01963 0.059 0.05908 0.0394 0.04146
[6.99]*** [7.09]*** [1.35] [1.41] [8.83]*** [8.84]*** [2.46]** [2.56]**
Number of working adults to total household members 0.02069 0.01903 0.11425 0.11629 0.03896 0.03855 0.03612 0.03262
[1.31] [1.22] [2.07]** [2.08]** [3.00]*** [2.99]*** [0.99] [0.88]
Rural -0.06234 -0.06354 -0.17685 -0.16695 -0.0764 -0.07494 0.05707 0.04074
[1.52] [1.55] [1.49] [1.40] [1.61] [1.58] [0.43] [0.30]
Log (pc income before remittances) 0.12844 0.13104 0.16109 0.20416 0.1874 0.20344 0.12041 0.17218
[5.99]*** [6.02]*** [2.46]** [2.79]*** [6.93]*** [7.29]*** [2.04]** [2.32]**
House ownership 0.01111 0.01263 0.11029 0.11354 0.0027 0.00405 -0.01039 -0.01004
[0.30] [0.34] [1.10] [1.12] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08]
Observations 4785 4785 643 643 4623 4623 639 639
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09
Dependent Variable:Weight-to-age z-score
Ecuador Honduras
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 16
Remittances and Height-to-Age Z-Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Receives remittances 0.03308 0.20412
[0.59] [3.12]***
Receives remittances X Poor 0.15256 0.5391
[1.11] [4.76]***
Log (pc remmitances) 0.04048 0.03051
[1.23] [0.66]
Log(pc remittances) X Poor 0.11668 0.06948
[1.68]* [1.94]*
Age 0.09279 0.0927 0.08673 0.08391 -0.00185 -0.00195 -0.10777 -0.10973
[4.44]*** [4.44]*** [1.48] [1.45] [0.07] [0.08] [1.34] [1.38]
Female 0.05784 0.0586 0.04357 0.05749 0.05167 0.04973 0.15777 0.13352
[1.64] [1.66]* [0.43] [0.56] [1.24] [1.19] [1.33] [1.13]
Oldest child 0.03244 0.03176 0.20573 0.21214 0.04741 0.05085 0.06866 0.07016
[0.71] [0.70] [1.45] [1.51] [0.84] [0.91] [0.45] [0.46]
Number of children under 10 years old -0.17388 -0.17381 -0.16454 -0.15893 -0.17923 -0.17428 -0.16209 -0.15733
[9.88]*** [9.88]*** [3.26]*** [3.15]*** [9.15]*** [8.89]*** [2.90]*** [2.87]***
Age of household head 0.00582 0.0058 -0.00023 -0.00015 0.00381 0.0039 0.00328 0.00414
[3.73]*** [3.72]*** [0.06] [0.04] [2.10]** [2.15]** [0.71] [0.90]
Female-headed household 0.13923 0.12983 0.1138 0.09218 0.15375 0.10752 0.26129 0.22668
[1.35] [1.26] [0.62] [0.55] [1.85]* [1.30] [1.44] [1.28]
Married household head 0.10763 0.09825 0.17595 0.13393 0.18668 0.14669 0.17406 0.157
[1.01] [0.92] [0.92] [0.72] [2.10]** [1.65]* [0.87] [0.79]
Maximum years of education in the household 0.0466 0.0464 0.03202 0.03013 0.07335 0.07223 0.06867 0.06718
[7.82]*** [7.86]*** [1.89]* [1.79]* [9.94]*** [9.81]*** [3.63]*** [3.51]***
Number of working adults to total household members 0.05463 0.05422 0.0619 0.05809 0.02066 0.02208 -0.00838 -0.01039
[3.36]*** [3.38]*** [0.97] [0.91] [1.50] [1.62] [0.20] [0.25]
Rural -0.09848 -0.09733 -0.45893 -0.44213 -0.20358 -0.19786 -0.05881 -0.09209
[2.23]** [2.21]** [3.34]*** [3.22]*** [3.68]*** [3.58]*** [0.35] [0.55]
Log (pc income before remittances) 0.11676 0.12256 0.06762 0.15492 0.19984 0.2332 0.08362 0.19749
[4.99]*** [5.18]*** [0.86] [1.70]* [6.95]*** [7.85]*** [1.30] [2.19]**
House ownership -0.0825 -0.08135 0.14646 0.14996 -0.00441 -0.00369 -0.00532 -0.01292
[2.10]** [2.07]** [1.31] [1.36] [0.09] [0.08] [0.04] [0.10]
Observations 3004 3004 402 402 2835 2835 375 375
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.2 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.15
Dependent Variable: Height-to-age z-score
Ecuador Honduras
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 17
Remittances and Outcomes: Summary Table (*)
Variable of interest/Country
Expected 
Sign
Ecuador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
Remittances / Pensions Substitution - Y N Y N
Co-residence + Y Y Y ?
Elderly labor participation - Y Y Y Y
Early retirement + Y Y Y Y
Health expenditures + Y N Y Y
School attendance + Y Y N Y
Private school attendance + Y Y Y Y
Education expenditures + Y Y ? Y
Child labor - Y Y Y Y
Weight-to-age score + Y Y n.a. n.a.
Height-to-age score + Y Y n.a. n.a.
(*) Y (Yes) means that the estimated coefficient showed the expected sign and was significant at 10% or less in at least 
one of the remittances variables (i.e., Receives remittances, Receives remittances × Poor, Log(Per capita remittances), 
Log(Per capita remittances) × Poor). N (No) means that either the estimate did not display the expected sign or was 
non-significant. Finally, the symbol (?) implies that significant coefficients of opposite sign were found for different 
remittances variables.
Table 18
Remittances and Elderly-Related Outcomes: Propensity Score Matching Approach
Ecuador ATT t-stat p-val
Labor participation -0,033 -1,385 0,166
Elderly & retired 0,043 2,244 0,025
Co-residence 0,137 5,720 0,000
Log(health expenditures) 0,451 6,261 0,000
Honduras ATT t-stat p-val
Labor participation -0,035 -1,187 0,235
Elderly & retired 0,051 1,934 0,053
Co-residence 0,035 1,714 0,087
Log(health expenditures) 0,566 4,216 0,000
Mexico ATT t-stat p-val
Labor participation -0,082 -2,874 0,004
Elderly & retired 0,109 4,144 0,000
Co-residence -0,059 -2,427 0,015
Log(health expenditures) 0,217 2,578 0,010
Nicaragua ATT t-stat p-val
Labor participation -0,076 -2,933 0,003
Elderly & retired 0,071 2,877 0,004
Co-residence 0,063 2,407 0,016
Log(health expenditures) 0,552 4,716 0,000
Table 19
Remittances and Children-Related Outcomes: Propensity Score Matching Approach
Ecuador ATT t-stat p-val
School attendance 0.039 3.350 0.001
Private school attendance 0.041 2.460 0.014
Child labor -0.042 -2.744 0.006
Log(Education Expenditures) 0.205 7.281 0.000
Haz 0.016 0.322 0.747
Waz 0.000 -0.007 0.994
Honduras ATT t-stat p-val
School attendance 0.032 2.618 0.009
Private school attendance 0.052 3.359 0.001
Child labor -0.041 -3.450 0.001
Log(Education Expenditures) 0.167 4.881 0.000
Haz 0.099 1.686 0.092
Waz 0.201 2.786 0.005
Mexico ATT t-stat p-val
School attendance 0.022 1.203 0.229
Private school attendance -0.028 -2.624 0.009
Child labor -0.035 -1.887 0.059
Log(Education Expenditures) 0.073 1.717 0.086
Nicaragua ATT t-stat p-val
School attendance 0.047 3.483 0.000
Private school attendance 0.022 1.668 0.095
Child labor -0.038 -2.737 0.006
Log(Education Expenditures) 0.149 4.641 0.000
Table 20
Life Cycle Deficits and Household Deficits
Ratio of [Consumption minus Labor Income] to Consumption
Ecuador
Total 
Households
Without 
remittances
With 
remittances
Difference between 
with and without 
remittances
Household Members 14 
years old and under
0.986 0.985 0.989 -0.003
Household Members 15-64 
years old 
-0.499 -0.595 -0.105 -0.490
Household Members 65 
years old and above
0.420 0.343 0.636 -0.293
Honduras
Total 
Households
Without 
remittances
With 
remittances
Difference between 
with and without 
remittances
Household Members 14 
years old and under 0.990 0.989 0.994 -0.006
Household Members 15-64 
years old 
-0.113 -0.187 0.157 -0.345
Household Members 65 
years old and above
0.491 0.419 0.686 -0.267
Mexico
Total 
Households
Without 
remittances
With 
remittances
Difference between 
with and without 
remittances
Household Members 14 
years old and under 0.990 0.990 0.989 0.000
Household Members 15-64 
years old -0.288 -0.314 0.354 -0.669
Household Members 65 
years old and above 0.570 0.561 0.690 -0.129
Nicaragua
Total 
Households
Without 
remittances
With 
remittances
Difference between 
with and without 
remittances
Household Members 14 
years old and under
0.988 0.988 0.987 0.001
Household Members 15-64 
years old 
-0.376 -0.489 -0.041 -0.448
Household Members 65 
years old and above
0.113 -0.292 0.612 -0.905
Table 21
Life Cycle Deficits, Household Deficits, and Remittances
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
0.01778 -0.00595 0.03375 0.00491
[2.77]*** [0.89] [2.55]** [0.37]
0.05549 0.05717 0.06264 0.06650
[13.21]*** [11.37]*** [10.31]*** [9.30]***
Age of head 0.00168 0.00109 0.00136 0.00098 0.00058 0.00088
[4.76]*** [3.68]*** [3.91]*** [2.54]** [1.74]* [2.31]**
Max. years of educ. in the household 0.00624 0.00707 0.00720 0.00844 0.00952 0.01060
[6.46]*** [8.55]*** [7.51]*** [7.31]*** [9.26]*** [9.07]***
Rural -0.06244 -0.05307 -0.05896 -0.04015 -0.03741 -0.03826
[6.56]*** [6.37]*** [6.29]*** [3.65]*** [3.78]*** [3.53]***
House ownership -0.00759 -0.00882 -0.01228 0.01696 0.01521 0.01166
[0.84] [1.13] [1.38] [1.71]* [1.71]* [1.19]
Number of household members 0.00439 0.00759 0.00806 -0.00052 0.00223 0.00149
[2.09]** [4.39]*** [3.86]*** [0.25] [1.27] [0.73]
Elderly presence in the household 0.04226 0.03530 0.02688 0.03218 0.02931 0.02040
[3.02]*** [3.03]*** [1.96]** [2.09]** [2.18]** [1.36]
Observations 8512 10849 8512 6803 8124 6803
LR chi2 222.92 445.06 367.98 226.86 347.98 323.98
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
(Consumption-Labor 
Income)/Consumption [Overall household]
Ecuador Honduras
(Consumption-Labor 
Income)/Consumption [Individuals under 
15 and above 64]
Dependent Variable: Household 
receives remittances
Robust z statistics in parenthesis
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Table 21 (cont.)
Life Cycle Deficits, Household Deficits, and Remittances
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
0.00331 -0.02144 0.05163 0.01162
[1.33] [15.22]*** [5.15]*** [1.16]
0.05795 0.07366 0.12495 0.11275
[29.55]*** [25.48]*** [16.04]*** [12.93]***
Age of head 0.00013 -0.00005 -0.00013 0.00485 0.00469 0.00481
[0.83] [0.56] [1.14] [10.31]*** [11.06]*** [10.37]***
Max. years of educ. in the household -0.00247 -0.00042 -0.00026 0.00221 0.00438 0.00370
[5.31]*** [1.71]* [0.81] [1.52] [3.33]*** [2.58]**
Rural 0.05014 0.03192 0.03039 -0.08939 -0.08503 -0.09153
[11.16]*** [11.95]*** [9.55]*** [7.26]*** [7.51]*** [7.53]***
House ownership -0.00179 -0.00192 -0.00399 -0.02199 -0.02763 -0.02209
[0.42] [0.80] [1.31] [1.57] [2.15]** [1.60]
Number of household members 0.00012 0.00366 0.00406 -0.01422 -0.00993 -0.01059
[0.13] [7.65]*** [6.40]*** [6.38]*** [5.02]*** [4.82]***
Elderly presence in the household 0.00755 -0.00128 -0.00680 0.06432 0.03723 0.03690
[1.18] [0.41] [1.65]* [3.58]*** [2.40]** [2.10]**
Observations 15196 20524 15196 5973 6861 5973
LR chi2 441.18 1651.3 1290.49 560.14 865.59 749.94
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.12
(Consumption-Labor 
Income)/Consumption [Overall 
household]
(Consumption-Labor 
Income)/Consumption [Individuals under 
15 and above 64]
Dependent Variable: Household 
receives remittances
Mexico Nicaragua
Robust z statistics in parenthesis
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
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